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FUNCTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN 3-D
ALEJANDRO E. CAMACHO∗ and ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN∗∗
ABSTRACT
The creation of new administrative agencies and the realignment of
existing governmental authority are commonplace and high-stakes events,
as illustrated by the recent creation of the Department of Homeland
Security after 9/11 and of new financial regulatory agencies after the
global recession of 2009. Scholars and policymakers have not devoted
sufficient attention to this subject, failing to clearly identify the different
dimensions along which government authority may be structured or to
consider the relationships among them. Analysis of these institutional
design issues typically also gives short shrift to whether authority should
be allocated differently based on agency function. These failures have
contributed to reorganization efforts that have proven ill-suited to
achieving policymakers’ goals due to mismatches between the perceived
defects of existing structures and the allocations of authority chosen to
replace them. This Article introduces a framework for assessing how
governmental authority may be structured along three dimensions:
centralization, overlap, and coordination. Using examples from diverse
policy areas including national security, financial markets, and
environmental protection, it demonstrates how differentiating among these
dimensions and among particular governmental functions better
illuminates the advantages and disadvantages of available structural
options. Though recognizing that the optimal allocation of authority is
inexorably context-specific, the Article concludes with preliminary
observations about how certain allocations of authority are likely to better
promote important social policy goals than others.
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INTRODUCTION
The creation of new programs and administrative agencies and the
realignment of existing governmental authority are commonplace. Within
just the past decade, high-profile reorganizations have followed the events
of 9/11 (which led to the massive reshuffling that accompanied the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security), 1 the Deepwater
Horizon explosion (which prompted the reallocation of regulatory
authority over offshore oil exploration and development), 2 and the late2000s global recession (which led to the creation of the Financial Stability
Oversight Council and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the
merging of the Office of Thrift Supervision into the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency).3 As in these instances, these changes often
occur in response to crisis,4 though the prompt for program creation or
1

See generally Dara Kay Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar & Barry R. Weingast,
Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandate, 59
STAN. L. REV. 673, 718 (2006); Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart
Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L.
REV. 1655 (2006).
2
See Secretary of the Interior, Order No. 3299 (May 19, 2010); Reorganization of The
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement,
http://www.boemre.gov.
3
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). According to two observers, “it is the rare President that does not
propose to reorganize some part of the federal government.” David A. Hyman &
William E. Kovacic, Government Organization/Reorganization: Why Who Does What
Matters, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2110351, at 2.
Other notable reorganization initiatives in just the past year include a 2013 Executive
Order to coordinate agency efforts to reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure,
Improving Critical Infrastructure (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/02/12/executive-order-improving-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity; a 2012
proposal to merge the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission into a new Securities and Derivatives Commission, H.R. 6613,
112th Cong. (2012); the creation in 2009 and rapid elimination in 2012 of a new Center
on Climate Change and National Security within the Central Intelligence Agency, John
M. Broder, C.I.A. Closes Its Climate Change Office, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2012); a 2012
proposal to increase coordination among seven federal agencies responsible for
conducting space weather research under the supervision of the National Science and
Technology Council, Statement of Daniel N. Baker before the Subcommittee on Space
and Aeronautics Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives
(Nov.
28,
2012),
http://science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/HHRG112-SY16-WState-DBaker-20121128.pdf; and a 2011 proposal to create new regional
information and response entities to increase coordination among federal and state
agencies in addressing cancer clusters, S. 76, 112th Cong. (2011). See also infra notes 920 and accompanying text (describing another important recent reorganization proposal).
4
See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1152 (2012) (“The most significant government reorganization
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government reorganization sometimes has been the gradual recognition of
deficiencies in existing regulatory programs.5
Scholars and policymakers alike have devoted considerable attention
to the proper allocation of governmental authority, traditionally focusing
on the appropriate scale of government (and in particular on federalism).6
Over the past decade, some scholars have analyzed the appropriateness of
jurisdictional overlap.7 More recently, others have sought to account for
the value of coordination among agencies.8 However, these debates over
governmental configuration have insufficiently focused on the
relationships among these different dimensions of authority. Additionally,
such discussions typically ignore whether the fitness of a particular
allocation should depend on the governmental function being exercised.
of the last fifty years occurred after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, when
Congress opted to combine scores of agencies into a DHS, a new ‘mega-agency.’”).
5
The shift of environmental regulatory authority from the states to the federal
government during the 1970s is a prominent example. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE
MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 67 (2004).
6
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987);
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 459 (2012); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Daniel Esty, Revitalizing
Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996) [hereinafter Esty,
Environmental Federalism]; Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance,
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1562 (1999) [hereinafter Esty, Environmental Governance];
Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(2011); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race
to the Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation," 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1210 (1992); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196
(1977).
7
See, e.g., PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S
CORE QUESTION (Cambridge U. Press 2009, William W. Buzbee ed.); ROBERT A.
SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM (Columbia U. Press 2009); David E. Adelman &
Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental
Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2007); Ann Carlson, Iterative Federalism
and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009); William W. Buzbee, Recognizing
the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003); J.R.
DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217
(2005); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006); Heather K. Gerken, Federalism All the
Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change,
Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling
Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59 (2010).
8
See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the
Regulatory State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578 (2010); Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do:
How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
1 (2009); Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 745
(2011); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4.
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We use the word function to refer to the nature of the authority engaged in
by, or the role assigned to, an agency (such as monitoring, information
dissemination, financing, planning, standard setting, or enforcement), as
opposed to the substantive subject matter of the agency’s delegated
authority. This Article addresses these neglected dimensional and
functional aspects of the analysis of allocating authority and sheds light on
how these features illuminate the policy tradeoffs among alternative
structural designs.
A recent reorganization proposal concerning small business regulation
serves as a useful introduction to the Article’s multi-dimensional and
functional analysis. In 2012, President Obama proposed to consolidate six
agencies into a single new Department that would more efficiently
promote competitiveness, exports, and American business. 9 The six
agencies – the business and trade functions of the U.S. Department of
Commerce, the Small Business Administration, the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency –
all focus primarily on business and trade. The White House and others10
explained that overlapping responsibilities among these agencies had
made it hard for small businesses to interact with the government and
contributed to “unnecessary waste and duplication.”11 To address these
concerns, the Obama proposal would centralize authority by integrating
the programs of the six eliminated agencies into four divisions of the new
Department. The Administration and congressional allies asserted that
this consolidation would create a more efficient and effective structure for
promoting American business by eliminating duplication and overlap 12
9

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Announces Proposal
to Reform, Reorganize and Consolidate Government (Jan. 13, 2012) [hereinafter
Consolidate
Government], available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/01/13/president-obama-announces-proposal-reform-reorganize-andconsolidate-gov. The proposal was introduced in different forms in the Senate and the
House of Representatives in 2012. See S. 2129, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R. 4409, 112th
Cong. (2012). Though the bill has yet to advance to a vote, the Obama Administration
intends to support the proposals in the 113th Congress. See Al Kamen, The secretary of
what, now?, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2012.
10
See Statement of Sen. Tom Carper at hearings on “Retooling Government for the 21st
Century: The President'
s Reorganization Plan and Reducing Duplication” (Mar. 21,
2012), at 2, http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/retooling-government-for-the-21stcentury-the-presidents-reorganization-plan-and-reducing-duplication
(describing
undesirable duplication created by the existence of multiple agencies “that produce
statistical output as a part of their programmatic responsibilities”).
11
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Government Reorganization Fact
Sheet (Jan. 13, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/01/13/government-reorganization-fact-sheet.
12
See, e.g., Consolidate Government, supra note 9; Testimony of Daniel Werfel,
Controller, Office of Management and Budget, Before the Committee on Homeland
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and increasing coordination.13 The Department would also create “a onestop shop for everything from financing and export promotion to patent
protection and help commercializing innovative discoveries,” allowing
small business owners to work with one agency in receiving “the core
Government services that will help them compete, grow, and hire.”14
Unfortunately, like so many other reorganizations, the
Administration’s proposal conflates the three distinctive dimensions of
authority identified by this Article—the extent of centralization, overlap,
and coordination of authority among agencies—and as a result fails to
propose a structure that is likely to directly address the Administration’s
underlying concerns. The expressed intent of this proposed reorganization
is to minimize overlap in agency authority and increase coordination.
However, the proposed solution is poorly designed to promote those goals
because it focuses on reallocating authority along one dimension of
authority—the centralization of the responsibilities of six agencies into a
single new Department—even though the purported problems relate to
agency structure and relationships along two entirely different dimensions
(unnecessary overlap and lack of interagency coordination). Centralizing
authority may or may not decrease the overlap of authority or increase the
level of agency coordination. The proposed new Department, in fact,
would be comprised of four divisions (small business, trade and
investment, technology and innovation, and statistics) with seemingly
overlapping jurisdictions. 15 Conversely, though decentralized authority
can also overlap, it need not do so.16 For example, duplication among
decentralized institutions can be reduced without centralizing authority if
the jurisdiction of existing agencies is redefined so that each agency has
distinct rather than overlapping responsibilities.
Similarly, both
centralized and decentralized allocations of authority can be highly

Security and Government Affairs, U.S. Senate, March 21, 2012, at hearings on
“Retooling Government for the 21st Century: The President’s Reorganization Plan and
Reducing
Duplication”
(Mar.
21,
2012),
at
4,
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/retooling-government-for-the-21st-century-thepresidents-reorganization-plan-and-reducing-duplication; Reorganization Fact Sheet,
supra note 11.
13
See, e.g., Statement of Sen. Tom Carper at hearings on “Retooling Government for the
21st Century: The President'
s Reorganization Plan and Reducing Duplication” (Mar. 21,
2012), at 2, http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/retooling-government-for-the-21stcentury-the-presidents-reorganization-plan-and-reducing-duplication.
14
Testimony of Daniel Werfel, supra note 12, at 4.
15
For example, the small business and statistics divisions may have overlapping authority
over statistics pertaining to small businesses, and the small business and trade and
investment divisions may have overlapping jurisdiction over trade and investment issues
pertaining to small businesses.
16
See infra Part IV.B.1.
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coordinated or independent. 17 It is possible to require increased
coordination among multiple agencies without centralization of authority
or reduction in the number of agencies with relevant jurisdiction. By
conflating coordinated and distinct authority with centralization, the
Administration’s proposal missed an opportunity to tailor its
reorganization to actually fix the perceived flaws of the existing
government structure.
In addition to these dimensions of governmental authority, the Obama
reorganization proposal highlights another feature of governmental
organization that is often overlooked—functional jurisdiction. Regulatory
authority is organized not only substantively but also on the basis of
different governmental functions.18 Three of the divisions proposed for
the new Department would be organized around substantive authority—
the small business, trade and investment, and technology and innovation
divisions—while the remaining one would be organized around an
information-gathering function—the production and analysis of statistics.
As this Article explains, focusing on functional jurisdiction provides a
number of key insights. For one, two government agencies with
substantive authority over the same issue—for example, small
businesses—will not have overlapping authority if their functions are
distinct. The small business division, for instance, may be charged with
planning, standard-setting, and implementation functions regarding small
businesses, while the statistics division may be charged with information
gathering on those small businesses. Functional division among multiple
agencies with jurisdiction over the same subject therefore can reduce
duplication even without centralization of agency authority.
Focusing on the largely neglected functional aspect of organization
and clearly delineating the differences among the three dimensions of
authority provides further valuable insights. In particular, this Article
demonstrates that the optimal organizational structure along the three
dimensions is likely to differ depending on the particular governmental
function at issue. 19 It may make sense, for example, to centralize
information gathering authority (such as in the proposed small business
division for production and analysis of statistics) but create a decentralized
but coordinated structure for program implementation (such as by
retaining separate agencies for facilitating trade by and investment in
small businesses). As with many prior regulatory design reforms, the
Obama reorganization proposal’s conflation of the dimensions of authority
and inattention to functional jurisdiction obscured the tradeoffs that
different reorganization options entail. Organizational choices along each
17

See infra Part IV.B.2.
See infra Part II.
19
See infra Part IV.A.
18
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of the three dimensions will involve (and be informed by) a different set of
policy tradeoffs that are impossible to disaggregate if the existence of
three different dimensions and the availability of different configurations
based on function are not appreciated.
Analysis of the structures, jurisdictions, and relationships among
governmental institutions is vital to understanding and promoting their
efficacy at advancing public goals. 20 Yet institutional design questions
such as these are regularly overlooked, misanalyzed, or oversimplified.21
Given the recurrence of government reorganization efforts and the highstakes consequences they may entail, this Article provides an analytical
framework for assessing when realignment of agency authority is likely to
be beneficial and how it ought to proceed when circumstances warrant it.
Using examples from a range of regulatory areas, it demonstrates how
differentiating the choices of when to centralize, create overlap, and
require coordination among governmental institutions illuminates the
advantages and disadvantages of competing reorganization options. The
Article also explains how focusing on the particular governmental
function at issue further clarifies the advantages and disadvantages of
movement along the three dimensions of centralization, overlap, and
coordination.
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I briefly describes the
principal values that tend to be implicated in government reorganization
efforts and that may be useful in assessing the merits of a particular
20

As Professor Magill has succinctly put it, “institutions matter.” Elizabeth Magill,
Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 903 (2009). See also Jason
Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2137151, at 2 (arguing that “agency interconnectedness will
become even more rooted in the bureaucracy over time, as regulatory problems show no
sign of becoming simpler and more amenable to single-agency solutions”).
21
As stated by Dean Phil Weiser:
The question of how to design and operate public institutions is often relegated
to a second order consideration and takes a backseat to the analysis of
substantive policy issues. . . . In particular, few commentators or policymakers
have focused on the question of what institutional strategy, structure, or set of
processes . . . to use and how any such regime would operate in practice.
The impact of institutional issues as an influence on the ultimate success of
an agency is grossly underappreciated. . . . Consequently, any focus on agency
effectiveness needs to ask how an agency is doing its work and not merely what
work it purports to be doing. Indeed, even the best-crafted statutory or
regulatory regime will fail if the institutional structure, processes, and culture
undermine the ability to implement the regime'
s goals effectively.
Philip J. Weiser, Towards an International Dialogue on the Institutional Side of Antitrust,
66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 447-48 (2011) (citations omitted). See also Hyman
& Kovacic, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that legal scholars have largely ignored issues
concerning “what an agency is assigned to do and where it is located”).
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initiative. Parts II and III provide a taxonomy of the different means of
allocating (and reallocating) authority among government entities. Part II
highlights a key but underappreciated distinction between the substantive
jurisdiction of regulators and the locus of control over different
governmental functions — what we call functional jurisdiction. Affording
attention to functional jurisdiction provides insights about the policy and
value tradeoffs among available options for allocating government
authority that may otherwise be obscured. Part III delineates the
dimensions of primary importance for characterizing allocation of
regulatory authority — the extent to which jurisdiction is centralized or
decentralized, overlapping or distinct, and coordinated or independent.
Part IV illustrates the utility of the analytical framework introduced in
Parts II and III, using a range of examples. Many of the examples involve
environmental regulation and natural resource management. We believe,
however, that the analysis in this Article is relevant to any form of
government organization, as examples from fields of regulation and
government activity such as financial markets, health care, and national
security illustrate. We derive three key lessons about the role of
functional jurisdiction and the value of clearly distinguishing among the
different dimensions of governmental authority. First, Part IV discusses
how both policymakers and the substantial federalism and governance
literature have largely both neglected the significance of functional
jurisdiction and conflated the dimensions identified in Part III in analyzing
the relative merit of alternative governmental structures. Second, it
explains how our focus on functional jurisdiction enriches the analysis of
the most promising ways to allocate governmental authority along a
different combination of dimensions based on the agency function
involved. Third, Part IV illustrates how crisp delineations among the
various dimensions of governmental authority clarify the analysis of the
tradeoffs among the policy values discussed in Part I that alternative
organizational options entail. By using this analytical framework,
policymakers will be better able to select the government structure that
strikes an appropriate balance among competing or conflicting values.
Undoubtedly, the appropriate choices along each of the dimensions,
and decisions on whether to differentiate structure based on function, will
necessarily be context-specific. We nonetheless conclude by providing a
set of preliminary observations about the relative merits of different
dimensional allocations of authority for each governmental function. We
assert that arguments for centralization and coordination are likely to be
more persuasive for certain kinds of agency research, information
distribution, and financing functions. We also posit that, in general,
arguments for decentralized authority usually will be strongest for
implementation and enforcement functions, and to a lesser extent
planning.
Likewise, though the considerable calls for increased
coordination among regulatory authorities may often be persuasive for
To be published in Volume 51 of the HARVARD JOURNAL ON LEGISLATION
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functions such as financing, information distribution, planning, and even
standard setting, we assert that the benefits from maintaining regulator
independence and even competition will typically be stronger for agencies
performing implementation and enforcement functions. Finally, although
we largely concur with the growing literature promoting the value of
shared substantive jurisdiction, we postulate that providing for distinct
functional jurisdiction will often provide opportunities to maintain the
advantages of redundancy while minimizing its disadvantages.
I. NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS FOR ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY
Determining how best to allocate the authority to design and
implement government programs requires a comparative assessment of the
extent to which alternative allocations promote desired normative values
or considerations. We use four such evaluative yardsticks in the
discussion below: effectiveness, efficiency, equity, and legitimacy. 22
When these measures point in different directions, determining the optimal
balance requires choosing among allocations that promote some but not
other values better than the available alternatives.
A. Effectiveness
An effective regulatory design is one that achieves the identified
regulatory goals. 23 A regulatory program that fails to achieve its goals
cannot be deemed a success even if it operates efficiently and fairly and is
administered by accountable officials.24 The effectiveness of a government
program may depend not only on how governmental authority is allocated,
but also on whether it is feasible to achieve the identified goals and
whether sufficient resources are available to government officials to
implement the program. 25 Our focus is on the impact of government
structure on program effectiveness.

22

Administrative law scholars have used similar metrics to evaluate regulatory programs.
See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform: The Effects of S. 1663 on
the Conduct of Federal Rate Proceedings, 16 ADMIN. L. REV. 108, 111-12 (1964)
(offering accuracy, efficiency, and acceptability to agency, participants, and the public as
metrics).
23
Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1150.
24
Cf. Sidney A. Shapiro, A Delegation Theory of the APA, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 89,
107 (1996) (referring to effectiveness as an administrative process value).
25
See, e.g., Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement
Districts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 460 (1999) (discussing
relevance of resource adequacy to effectiveness of regulation); Sidney A. Shapiro,
Agency Priority Setting and the Review of Existing Agency Rules, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 370,
374 (1996).
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B. Efficiency
Assuming multiple options of equal efficacy exist, some may operate
more efficiently than others. Efficiency is relevant to the assessment of
institutional design, and involves comparing the administrative costs a
program imposes on government and the compliance costs imposed on the
private sector. 26 For example, the costs of administering redundant
structures “represent lost funds for other tasks. In other words, if resources
are fixed, redundant structures impose additional opportunity costs.”27
C. Equity
Although the concept of equity involves distributional considerations,
there are different ways to determine whether a particular allocation of
societal benefits and burdens is fair.28 Policy analysts of regulatory issues
sometimes use equity to refer to everything other than efficiency.29 Dan
Farber has used the term to include “any standard for determining the just
distribution of resources.” 30 One widely used distinction is between
distributive and corrective justice. The former deals with the allocation of
desirable resources in proportion to the “possession of some morally
relevant characteristic” such as humanity (which supports an egalitarian
distribution) or virtue (which favors some more than others).31 Corrective
(or compensatory) justice “seeks to correct transactional wrongs” by
requiring wrongdoers to compensate those whom they harm,32 and may
turn on whether mere causation is sufficient to trigger a compensatory
obligation or whether fault is also required.33 Making matters even more
26

Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1181-82. Efforts to improve efficiency seek to
“minimize the administrative costs of enforcement.” Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (1972).
27
O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1680.
28
See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN: GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
AND HUMAN AGENDA 252 (1993) (discussing the “difficulties of sorting through . . .
competing standards of ‘fairness’ to find the morally right one”).
29
See, e.g., Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang, Financial Institutions in Taiwan: An Analysis of
the Regulatory Scheme, 4 J. CHINESE L. 3, 33 (1990); Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of
Antitrust: Other than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV.
1191, 1192 (1977). But cf. Douglas Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global
Governance, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2109, 2160 (2005) (discussing market liberalism’s “view
that efficiency, equity, and sustainability are separable goals”).
30
Daniel A. Farber, What (If Anything) Can Economics Say About Equity?, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 1791, 1794 (2003).
31
Nathan B. Oman, The Honor of Private Law, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 38 (2011). See
also STONE, supra note 28, at 247-48 (describing distributive justice as dealing with
“situational disparities,” not actions).
32
Oman, supra note 31, at 38.
33
Id.
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complex, distributional concerns may arise in several guises, including
vertical,34 horizontal,35 geographical,36 and temporal.37
D. Legitimacy
Although there is broad consensus that legitimacy is a core
administrative law concern, and thus bears on the structure of
government, 38 legitimacy encompasses multiple considerations, which
scholars define and assess differently.39 We focus here on the aspects of
legitimacy most relevant to assessing alternative ways to organize
government. Legitimacy may be defined as “the acceptability of [a]

34

Vertical equity implicates “the fairness of the distribution of wealth among different
income groups.” Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and
Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L. J. 385, 415 (1977). A disaster preparedness plan that
facilitated evacuation of affected wealthy but not poor neighborhoods would raise
vertical equity concerns. Vertical equity concerns are the focus of the environmental
justice movement, which posits that all persons are equally entitled to protection from
environmental harm. ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL
ACTION FOR A POST-KATRINA WORLD 118 (2010).
35
“Horizontal equity requires government to treat like persons alike.” Ellickson, supra
note 34, at 415. A plan that required individuals of similar income levels to pay different
amounts to finance protection measures, on the basis of some characteristic unrelated to
the degree of benefit individuals would accrue from the plan, would invoke horizontal
equity concerns.
36

Geographic concerns may arise from a regime that concentrates health and safety risks
in a particular location, such as the area surrounding a waste disposal facility or a highvolume pollution source.
37
Temporal equity deals with “the preservation or defeat of expectation interests.”
RICHARD B. STEWART & JAMES B. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY:
READINGS, MATERIALS AND NOTES 168 (1978). Temporal concerns, for example, may
arise when a government program foists costs on future generations that will not be able
to enjoy the benefits of the resource allocations that produce those costs. See generally
Neil H. Buchanan, What Kind of Environment Do We Owe Future Generations?, 5
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 339 (2011). These concerns would be implicated, for example,
if the government chose to indefinitely forestall taking steps to avoid damage caused by
the activities of the present generation, even though it would be far more expensive to
resolve the issue on a deferred basis.
38
See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy
in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 462 (2003) (“From the birth of the
administrative state, we have struggled to describe our regulatory government as the
legitimate child of a constitutional democracy.”); Sidney A. Shapiro, et al., The
Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 463 (2012) (“The history of administrative law in the United
States constitutes a series of ongoing attempts to legitimize unelected public
administration in a constitutional liberal democracy.”).
39
See Shapiro, et al., supra note 38, at 466 (“Legitimacy is a notoriously treacherous
concept.”).
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regulation to those involved in its development,” 40 which may be
enhanced through the availability of opportunities for public
participation.41 Social psychologists contend that participation enhances
perceptions of legitimacy “independently of whether outcomes ultimately
favor . . . participants.” 42 In addition, opportunities to participate are
consistent with democratic government.43
The legitimacy of a regulatory system also turns on the degree to
which it protects against deviation from legislative goals due to capture of
regulators by special interests.44 Regulators with conflicts of interest are
especially vulnerable to capture. 45 Procedural mechanisms such as
transparency and opportunities to participate can combat capture. 46 So,
too, can the availability of judicial review, which may be invoked by
stakeholders to prevent those implementing regulatory programs from
straying beyond legislative bounds.
Similarly, perceptions that decision makers are honest, unbiased47 and
competent promote legitimacy.48 In addition, assigning tasks to those with
40

Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit,
9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 63 (2000).
41
Transparency also promotes legitimacy because it “tends both to improve the quality of
decisions and to facilitate accountability to the electorate.” William H. Simon,
Democracy and Organization: The Further Reformation of American Administrative Law,
at 4, 7-8, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2175121 (arguing that transparency fosters “openness
to ongoing diffuse democratic pressures”).
42
Freeman & Langbein, supra note 40, at 67 (citing E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER,
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988)).
43
See id. at 133 (noting that broad participation and inclusiveness are generally laudable
goals and that, “all things being equal,” greater participation is more consistent with
democratic values than less participation). Cynthia Farina has called government
decision making that reflects the “will of the people” “the wellspring of legitimacy.”
Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 990 (1997). Government processes that are fair enhance
“identification with, and commitment to, the legal-political system.” Id. at 1035.
44
Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1185-87 (addressing the risks of capture of
agencies). A captured agency seeks to promote the agenda of those to which it is
beholden, even if that agenda deviates from statutory goals.
45
See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s
Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer
Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 232 (2004).
46
Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities
Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INTL. L. 883, 946 (2009).
47
Farina, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1035.
48
Legitimacy is the result of public confidence in the competence and trustworthiness of
officials. Terence R. Mitchell & William G. Scott, Leadership Failures, the Distrusting
Public, and Prospects of the Administrative State, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 445, 446 (1987).
Vesting decision-making authority in those with expertise on issues within their
jurisdiction can enhance the perception of competence, and therefore foster legitimacy.

To be published in Volume 51 of the HARVARD JOURNAL ON LEGISLATION

12

FUNCTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN 3-D

[30-Mar-13

expertise and providing them the tools to perform such tasks can also
increase the likelihood that programs will operate effectively, illustrating
that the four values we have identified are inter-related and may overlap.49
Likewise, the requirement that agencies provide reasons for their decisions
that are based on facts and rooted in the agencies’ statutory authority
provide constraints that promote legitimacy.50
E. Balancing Values in Allocating Government Authority
The four evaluative yardsticks discussed above are not meant to be an
exclusive recitation of the values implicated by government organization
or reorganization. They are among the most important measures for
assessing an allocation of governmental authority, however. In rare
instances, all four criteria may support a particular allocation. Most of the
time, however, an initiative designed to promote one of the measures is
likely to adversely affect one or more of the others.51 The proper balance
among the four criteria identified here will necessarily be contextspecific.52 For example, it may be preferable to sacrifice some degree of
effectiveness if the most effective option among several that promise to
achieve regulatory goals at least partially is also harshly inequitable or
vests in decision-makers authority that threatens legitimacy. These kinds
of tradeoffs of course are common under the American system of
government. 53 As long as the yardsticks are clearly identified and the
49

See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1185 (arguing that programs capable of
improving analysis by adding data and expertise are “likely to make decisions better”).
Another overlap involves consistent treatment of similarly situated entities, which
promotes both a sense of non-arbitrariness (and therefore of legitimacy) and of fair
treatment.
50
This requirement of “deliberation” enhances accountability by guarding against
arbitrariness. David L. Markell & Emily Hammond Meazell, Administrative Proxies for
Judicial
Review:
Building
Legitimacy
from
the
Inside-Out,
at
4,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2127838. The reasons requirement provides evidence of a
commitment to rationality. Id. at 14.
51
See, e.g., Eric Biber, The More the Merrier: Multiple Agencies and the Future of
Administrative Law Scholarship, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 78 (2012),
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/125/march12/forum_868.php#_ftnref: (“So long
as there are multiple things for the government to do, there will always be a question
about what organizational structure will allow it to be most successful in dealing with the
interactions among . . . different goals.”).
52
Accountability, for example, “guarantees responsiveness, although not necessarily
effectiveness.” Id. at 1719.
53
See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)
(stating that “the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in
facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the
Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives – or the
hallmarks – of democratic government . . . .”); id. at 958-59 (stating that “the Framers
ranked other values higher than efficiency.”). The Court, in striking down the legislative
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impact of a particular allocation on each is assessed, policymakers will be
able to make informed decisions on the best way to achieve an appropriate
balance among them. Parts III through V below illustrate in more detail
the kinds of tradeoffs likely to be implicated in choosing among possible
allocations of authority.
II. SUBSTANTIVE AND FUNCTIONAL ALLOCATIONS OF AUTHORITY
Regulatory authority can be assigned in two different ways. First, an
agency’s jurisdiction can be determined on the basis of the subject matter
it is authorized to regulate or manage (such as activities that result in air
pollution or mineral extraction on public lands). Second, jurisdiction can
be defined in terms of the functions an agency performs, such that
different agencies may be responsible for performing discrete tasks (such
as standard-setting, permitting, and enforcement) within the same
substantive area. For example, as illustrated in Figure 1 below, although
federal pollution control authority could be apportioned into substantive
silos according to the particular type of resource (e.g., air, water, or solid
waste), such authority could also be divided into functional categories
according to the governmental activity at issue (e.g., standard setting,
permitting, and enforcement). Alternatively (and more commonly), a
legislature or administrative agency might adopt a hybrid of substantive
and functional allocations in creating or reorganizing authority, in which
agencies are only provided authority over certain regulatory functions for
particular types of resources or regulatory problems.54

veto in Chadha, emphasized the Framers’ choice to sacrifice efficient for accountable,
democratic government through the imposition of requirements such as bicameralism and
presentment. Id. at 959.
54
See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text (describing organization of EPA and the
Internal Revenue Service).
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Figure 1. Substantive and Functional Jurisdiction

In characterizing governmental jurisdiction, primary attention tends to
be given to evaluating agency management based on the scope of the
substantive authority of the governmental entity. However, regulatory
authority is also consistently apportioned based on the function or
functions that a particular governmental institution may exercise. Though
some scholars have noted the existence of division of authority along
functional lines, 55 the significance of this component is considerably
underappreciated in the regulatory design literature.56
A. Substantive Jurisdiction
Perhaps the most elementary component for assessing how authority is
allocated in the management of environmental problems is substantive
jurisdiction. Administrative agencies are allocated limited substantive
authority to regulate or manage specific social issues or problems.
Workplace health and safety falls within the purview of the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration. The U.S. Department of Agriculture
deals with the agriculture industry. Transportation infrastructure is
55

Scholars investigating government organization who do refer to agency functions
frequently do so in a different sense than we are using that term. Rather than focusing on
the different kinds of tasks agencies perform, these scholars use functions to describe the
scope of an agency’s substantive jurisdiction (such as the authority to regulate air
pollution, but not water pollution). See, e.g., Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 3, at 25
(discussing the allocation of authority among three agencies to provide services for
veterans).
56
See infra Part IV.A.1.
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addressed by the Federal Highway Administration and the Department of
Transportation. Immigration is an activity supervised by the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services.
The Interstate Commerce
Commission, before Congress abolished it, managed interstate commerce
such as transportation of goods by rail. The Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention conduct disease research and coordinate disease prevention
measures. The Federal Emergency Management Agency is charged with
conducting disaster planning and management.
In environmental regulation, administrative authority is typically
restricted to regulation or management of a particular environmental
medium or waste. Federally designated wetlands are regulated by the
United States Army Corps of Engineers; air quality and non-nuclear
hazardous and solid waste are regulated by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and state air agencies; the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and Department of Energy control nuclear power generation
and waste management.
Regularly, substantive authority is divided based on particular features
or components of a medium. For example, surface water quality is
regulated by EPA and designated state water quality agencies (such as
California’s State Water Resources Control Board), while the allocation of
water supply falls within the domains of different state and local water
resources agencies (such as the California Department of Water Resources
and Metropolitan Water District of Southern California). Similarly,
management of terrestrial or freshwater (including endangered or
threatened) species is under the jurisdiction of the Interior Department’s
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), while marine (including
endangered or threatened) species are managed by the Commerce
Department’s National Marine Fisheries Service.
Public land
management is divided based on particular land management goals. At
the federal level alone, the national forests are managed by the United
States Forest Service (USFS), the national parks by the National Park
Service (NPS), wildlife refuges by the FWS, and federal lands not
otherwise specified by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Each of
these land management agencies is guided by a different management
standard, with the NPS and the FWS being charged primarily with the
duty to preserve natural resources and provide recreational opportunities,
while the USFS and the BLM are required to promote a broader range of
multiple uses of the lands under their jurisdiction.57
Such division, of course, is not unique to pollution control or natural
resources law. Drugs, cosmetics, and some food products are generally
57

See 1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW §§ 6:14-6:17 (West 2d ed. 2007).
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regulated by the Food and Drug Administration, while other foods (meat,
poultry, and processed egg products) are under the jurisdiction of the
United States Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection
Service.58 General product safety is regulated by the Federal Consumer
Product Safety Commission, while pesticide licensing is administered by
EPA.59 The Dodd-Frank Act60 vested authority to regulate providers of
consumer financial products and services, including insured banks,
savings and loans, and large credit unions, in one agency, but delegated to
a different agency regulatory control over smaller depository institutions,
and retained authority in still other agencies to regulate transactions in
securities and commodities futures.61 In addition, “informational privacy
is governed by a variety of different laws, administered by different
agencies . . . setting forth divergent requirements governing the treatment
of information by type and business sector.”62
Relatedly, substantive authority may be delegated to a particular
authority in recognition of that agency’s technical expertise that may be
brought to bear on the regulatory problem. For example, an expertise in
atmospheric chemistry is useful for understanding and regulating air
quality, an ecology background for managing biological resources, a
public health or medical background for disease prevention, or forestry
expertise for forest management. 63 California has vested multiple
agencies with authority to regulate different aspects of the electric utility
industry to reflect the expertise of each agency.64 Similarly, scholars have

58

See http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/default.htm, http://www.fda.gov/Cosmetics/default.htm;
http://www.fda.gov/Food/default.htm
(FDA
authorities);
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/About_FSIS/index.asp (FSIC authorities).
59
Compare http://www.cpsc.gov/about/about.html (describing CPSC jurisdiction) with
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/(linking to EPA pesticide regulatory initiatives).
60
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No, 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
61
Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Paradox of the Global and the Local in the Financial Crisis
of 2008: Applying the Lessons of Caritas in Veritate to the Regulation of Consumer
Credit in the United States and the European Union, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 173, 183-84
(2010-2011).
62
Kenneth A. Bamberger, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV.
247, 257 (2011).
63
For discussion of how different scientific disciplines affect the design and management
of natural resource regulatory systems, see Eric Biber, Which Science? Whose Science?
How Scientific Disciplines Can Shape Environmental Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (2012).
64
See Timothy P. Duane, Greening the Grid: Implementing Climate Change Policy
Through Energy Efficiency, Renewable Portfolio Standards, and Strategic Transmission
System Investments, 34 VT. L. REV. 711, 743-44 (2010).
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urged expansion of the Copyright Office’s authority over complex and
dynamic issues in which it has expertise.65
B. Functional Jurisdiction
Despite the relative inattention to it in the academic literature, the
nature of a governmental entity’s functional authority is perhaps of equal
importance to its substantive jurisdiction. Governmental authority may be
organized according to the particular regulatory activities or tasks in which
the agency is authorized to engage. Thus, although a statute may delegate
to several agencies the authority to regulate a particular set of private
activities, each agency may be in charge of a particular aspect of the
regulatory program. One agency, for example, may be responsible for
collecting information needed to make regulatory decisions, while another
may be charged with using that information to adopt regulatory standards
that constrain private conduct. The full array of agency functions include
monitoring (whether ambient, 66 compliance 67 or effect and effectiveness
monitoring 68 ); scientific research and data generation; information
organization and distribution; funding; planning; standard setting;
implementation and permitting; and enforcement.
For many environmental agencies, functional jurisdiction is a
subordinate form of regulatory division, such that the primary organizing
principle for determining the bounds of an agency’s authority involves
substantive authority, while the agency’s jurisdiction is secondarily based
on function. Typically, an agency is provided substantive authority over
particular resources, issues, or problems, for which it creates offices or
divisions that focus on sub-topics of that substantive authority. For
example, EPA includes Offices for Air and Radiation, Chemical Safety
and Pollution Prevention, Solid Waste and Emergency Response, and
Water, corresponding with its various substantive authorities to regulate
air quality, pesticides and toxic substances, solid and hazardous waste, and

65

See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 148 (2004). But cf,
Evan Stark, The Battered Mother in the Child Protective Service Caseload: Developing
an Appropriate Response, 23 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 107, 130 (2002) (criticizing New
York’s child protection laws on ground that “[d]omestic violence expertise within the
agency is isolated and without substantive authority”).
66
See, e.g., Eric Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring, 83 U. COLO. L. REV.
1 (2011) (detailing problems with ambient monitoring by resource agencies).
67
See, e.g., Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation
Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,252, 35,253 (June 1,
2000) (defining compliance monitoring).
68
See, e.g., id. (defining effect and effectiveness monitoring to include whether he action
or plan is achieving its stated goals and objectives).
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water quality, respectively.69 These subdivisions often have authority over
a range of functions, including monitoring, standard setting, and
implementation/permitting, with authority further subdivided either by
substantive subcategory and/or by functional activity.70
However, agencies also often contain divisions or offices dedicated to
particular regulatory functions, regardless of their substantive focus. At
EPA, these include the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance,
the Office of Environmental Information, the Office of General Counsel,
the Office of Inspector General, the Office of International and Tribal
Affairs, and the Office of Research and Development.71 These offices are
charged with enforcement, information gathering, and research,
respectively, across the entire range of EPA’s substantive authority.72 The
Internal Revenue Service has separate offices to handle tax issues
concerning small businesses and tax exempt organizations, a substantive
division of authority, but it also reflects functional divisions, with separate
offices for privacy and disclosure, whistleblowers, and criminal
investigations, all of which cut across substantive lines. 73 Agencies
routinely have separate offices to deal with congressional relations, media
and communications, and legal matters, regardless of the substantive
nature of the issue for which negotiations with the legislature, outreach of
the media, or legal advice is required.74
Such division of functional authority also occurs between agencies.
The federal Clean Water Act, for example, creates shared substantive
regulatory authority between EPA and the Corps of Engineers in
controlling wetlands development. The functions of the two agencies
69

EPA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/organization.html
(last visited Feb. 6, 2013).
70
In 1993, EPA reorganized the Office of Compliance and Enforcement by centralizing
in it enforcement authority previously dispersed among five offices. U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency Office of Environmental Justice in the Matter of the Fifth Meeting of
the Environmental Justice Advisory Council, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 623, 663 (1995).
This shift illustrates that the structural relationships among offices within a single agency
may differ along each of the three dimensions identified in this Article, just as
relationships may differ among separate agencies.
71
EPA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, supra note 69.
72
See Alfred E. Marcus, EPA’s Organizational Structure, 54-AUT. L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5, 23 (1991).
73
See http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/irs_org_chart_2012_.pdf (organizational chart of
the IRS).
74
See, e.g., United States Department of Agriculture, USDA Agencies and Offices,
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=AGENCIES_OFFICES_C
(describing offices within the Department of Agriculture, including the Office of
Communications, the Office of Congressional Relations, and the Office of the General
Counsel).
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largely differ, however. EPA and the Corps are jointly responsible for
issuing guidelines for the issuance of dredge and fill permits that allow for
the filling of wetlands,75 but the Corps is vested with the power to issue
permits, subject to only limited EPA override. 76 Similarly, under the
Clean Air Act, EPA is charged with developing national ambient air
quality standards to protect the public health and welfare,77 but the states
are primarily responsible for devising plans to implement and achieve
those standards.78
Furthermore, though most regulatory authority is delegated firstly
based on substantive scope, with functional jurisdiction usually a
secondary organizing criterion, some agencies are organized with function
as the principal basis for their authority. For instance, Congress has
delegated to the United States Government Accountability Office
responsibility for audit, investigation, reporting, and evaluation of the
federal agencies, regardless of the substantive area of regulation. 79
Similarly, the White House Council on Environmental Quality has been
granted responsibility to oversee implementation by all federal agencies of
environmental impact assessment under the National Environmental
Policy Act,80 including promulgation of guidelines and dispute resolution
when there is interagency conflict.81 The United States Geological Survey
is a research-only agency that generates biological, geographical,
geological, and hydrological information that helps inform policy by
regulatory authorities, but has no regulatory functions of its own.82 More
broadly, of course, the separation of legislative, executive, and
adjudicative power among the branches of government is a form of
functional jurisdiction. In this regard, William Buzbee has noted that a
type of regulatory fragmentation, “institutional fragmentation,” is the
result of an allocation of authority to “diverse institutions such as
legislatures, agencies, courts and legally empowered citizens.”83 As more
fully explored in Part IV, one of the principal aims of this Article is to
encourage policymakers and scholars to focus more attention on whether
75

33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (2006).
Id. § 1344(a).
77
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2006).
78
Id. § 7410(a). EPA may adopt a plan if a state fails to submit an acceptable plan in
limited circumstances. Id. § 7410(c).
79
http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html.
80
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4375 (2006).
81
The
Council
on
Environmental
Quality
–
About,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/about (“CEQ . . . acts as a referee
when agencies disagree over the adequacy of such assessments.”).
82
United States Geological Survey, About USGS, http://www.usgs.gov/aboutusgs/.
83
William W. Buzbee, The Regulatory Fragmentation Continuum, Westway and the
Challenges of Regional Growth, 21 J.L. & POL. 323, 348 (2005).
76
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evaluating and allocating agency authority along functional rather than
substantive lines holds greater promise of achieving the policy goals of a
particular government program at least cost to competing policy goals.
III. A TAXONOMY OF ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY
This Part sets forth various key dimensions for analyzing the allocation
of authority for addressing regulatory problems. For any substantive area
of regulation and governmental function, regulatory authority can be
further evaluated along three key dimensions. As illustrated in Figure 2,
these include how centralized the authority is; how much overlap in
governmental authority there is among multiple government bodies with
concurrent jurisdiction over a particular regulatory problem; and the extent
to which such authority is exercised independently or in coordination with
other governmental entities with authority over a particular substantive
area or function.
Figure 2. Dimension Relationships

As explained in Part IV, some of these dimensions have been ignored
or conflated in the diverse and substantial federalism and governance
literature. Yet each measures a particular component of regulatory
authority, representing a different set of policies and ultimately values
tradeoffs over the appropriate design for managing social problems.
Accordingly, changes in the allocation of authority to address a regulatory
problem may be appropriate along one dimension, but not others.
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A. Decentralized versus Centralized Authority
At least in the legal academic literature, perhaps the most frequently
analyzed dimension for characterizing the allocation of regulatory
authority focuses on the scale or level of government which is granted
jurisdiction. As illustrated in Figure 3 below, governmental authority
could be allocated anywhere in a range between more or less centralized.
On one extreme, a regime may be preemptively federal (e.g., the
regulation of immigration,84 space exploration,85 or nuclear production86
or waste).87 On the other end of the spectrum are regimes where authority
is primarily local, such as land use zoning or the administration of water
rights. In between, there is a vast range of hybrids of federal, state, and
local authority. Some regimes involve various federal agencies;88 others
consist of a federal regulator and single state regulator whose standards
other states can opt to follow;89 still others a combination of both federal
and state agencies.90
Accordingly, one key question for this dimension is whether authority
over resources is primarily decentralized to a local or state jurisdiction or
more centralized at the federal level. Another question, however, is
whether regulatory authority within a certain level is delegated to one
entity or divided among two or more entities. Thus, if a statute allows
only federal agencies to address a problem (preempting supplemental state
or local regulation), the regime is centralized compared to one in which
84

But cf. Arizona v. U.S., 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (refusing to enjoin implementation of
state law requiring police to determine the immigration status of persons they stop, detain,
or arrest on some other legitimate basis if “reasonable suspicion exists that the person is”
an unlawful alien).
85
Cf. Van C. Ernest, Note, Third Party Liability of the Private Space Industry: to Pay
What No One Has Paid Before, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 503, 533 (1991) (referring to
“extensive federal regulation of space exploration”).
86
See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'
n, 461
U.S. 190 (1983) (addressing impact of exclusive federal authority to regulate design and
operation of nuclear power plants for health and safety, but not economic purposes).
87
Id. at 218 (discussing Department of Energy’s control over nuclear waste disposal).
88
See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006) (requiring consultation among federal agencies
on impacts of proposed activities on endangered species); 42 U.S.C. § 7475(d) (2006)
(establishing role for federal land management agencies in EPA review of state
disposition of permit applications for construction of sources whose emissions might
affect federal lands such as national parks).
89
An example is automobile tailpipe emission regulation under the Clean Air Act, which
grants EPA exclusive standard-setting authority, but allows California regulators to set
alternative standards that, if approved by EPA, other state agencies can follow. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7507, 7543 (2006).
90
For example, stationary source regulation under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7402
(2006), or public land management. See 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 57, at §
1:1.
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regulators in all fifty states were allowed to regulate. Within the federal
government, regulatory authority could be fully centralized in one agency
or decentralized by dividing authority among multiple federal agencies.91
We regard the degree of fragmentation of authority among multiple
regulators as a second aspect of characterizing a regulatory regime as
centralized or decentralized.92
Figure 3. Centralized versus Decentralized Authority

91

An example may best illustrate the point. With some exceptions, the authority to
regulate federally owned lands is the sole prerogative of the federal government, so that
the authority is centralized. In those substantive areas in which states retain concurrent
jurisdiction, such as wildlife management, authority is more decentralized. See 3
COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 57, § 32:8. If Congress had vested federal land
management authority in a single federal agency, authority would have been centralized
still further. Instead, jurisdiction to manage different kinds of federal lands systems (e.g.,
national parks, national forests, wildlife refuges, and other public lands) has been
delegated to (and decentralized among) a group of agencies, including the National Park
Service, the National Forest Service, the FWS, and the Bureau of Land Management.
92
Similarly, even if authority is delegated exclusively to one agency, federal or state, that
agency may contain multiple offices, divisions, or bureaus. If so, authority is
decentralized within the agency, and authority among the components within the agency
can be overlapping or distinct, and coordinated or independent. For purposes of this
Article, when we refer to a fully centralized agency, we mean an agency that has no
internal subdivisions. We recognize, however, that subdivisions within an agency may
be aligned at different points along the overlap and coordination dimensions, just as
multiple agencies may be so aligned.
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1. Decentralized Authority
For centuries, at least as far back as the origination of the concept of
subsidiarity, 93 scholars have promoted the idea that authority is best
allocated at the local level. 94 A popular rationale for decentralized
regulation is its ability to leverage local knowledge and expertise,95 while
a related, second justification might be to ensure regulation is better
tailored to local conditions, preferences, and economic conditions.96 We
refer to these justifications respectively as the expertise and diversity
rationales for decentralized regulation.
Third, many argue that
decentralized government of this first kind allows opportunities for
regulatory experimentation that can encourage innovation.97 These three
justifications for localizing regulation are primarily (although not
exclusively) based on the pursuit of more effective regulation.98
A related and commonly purported benefit of decentralized
governance is that interlocal competition maximizes social utility by
93

Subsidiarity is the organizing principle “that a central authority should have a
subsidiary function, performing only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively
at a more immediate or local level.”
Oxford English Dictionary,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/193007?redirectedFrom=subsidiarity#eid. It is a general
principle of European Union law. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European
Union, Article 5(3).
94
See Jeffrey S. Dornbos, All (Water) Politics Is Local: A Proposal for Resolving
Transboundary Water Disputes, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 17 (2010) (“[T]he
Constitution'
s structure of reserving non-enumerated powers to the states ‘suggests a
principle of ‘subsidiarity’”) (citation omitted).
95
See, e.g., Dornbos, supra note 94, at 17. Professor Vermeule distinguishes between
“local” and “global” knowledge, with proponents of decentralized authority tending to
prefer context-specific knowledge about economic or regulatory programs, while
advocates of centralized programs tend to focus on the benefits of a broader “:synoptic”
approach to regulation. Adrian Vermeule, Local and Global Knowledge in the
Administrative State, at 2, 18, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2169939. Much as we do in this
article with respect to the three dimensions we address, Professor Vermeule recognizes
that the distinction between contextual and synoptic knowledge is “highly stylistic,
whereas in reality there is a continuum between the two extremes and everything is a
matter of degree.” Id.
96
See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 136-37 (2005).
97
See, e.g., Dornbos, supra note 94, at 17 (noting that states may “act as ‘laboratories’ for
innovative solutions”); David L. Markell, States as Innovators: It'
s Time for a New Look
to Our “Laboratories of Democracy” in the Effort to Improve Our Approach to
Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347, 355 (1994) (describing capacity of state
and local governments to act as “innovation centers” for environmental regulation by
providing “the opportunity to try a wide variety of approaches simultaneously or within
short periods of time”); Adler, supra note 96, at 137.
98
Though primarily based on promoting effective regulation, the diversity justification
for decentralization—allowing regulation more closely tailored to local conditions and
circumstances—can also be justified on equity grounds.
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allowing each local community to shape its interests and goals. 99 As
indicated below, however, though some level of decentralization may be a
necessary condition for competition to occur, we think that competition of
this kind flows more precisely from what we define as independently
structured government authority than from decentralization. 100 Finally,
some also argue that localized allocation of authority makes decisionmakers more accessible and therefore promotes more accountable and
democratic governance.101 A related claim postulates that local regulators
tend to be more accountable than regulators at higher government levels.
Relying on these various justifications, before 1960 state and local
laws were the only significant governmental constraints on pollution in the
United States, with a few exceptions.102 These included state common law
causes of action such as nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict liability,
as well as local land use regulations designed to segregate industrial from
residential uses, thereby minimizing opportunities for pollution produced
by the former to harm the latter.103 Other examples of traditional state and
local regulation that the Supreme Court has identified include matters of
health care and protection of public safety, 104 such as regulation of
vaccines, 105 advertising, 106 family and probate law, 107 employee welfare

99

See generally Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. 64 J. POL. ECON.
416 (1956) (promoting decentralization model premised on interlocal competition for
consumer-voters); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (same).
According to one source, “[u]nder competitive federalism, state and federal governments
compete with one another to provide regulation to a mobile citizenry.” Bruce Johnsen,
The Evolution of Sherman Act Jurisdiction: A Roadmap for Competitive Federalism, 7 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 403, 405 (2004).
100
See infra Part III.C.2.
101
See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT
BUILDING WALLS (PRINCETON U. PRESS 1999).
102
The River and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407, prohibited the discharge of
“refuse matter” without a federal permit, but the program’s principal objective was to
promote commerce by preserving navigability. Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative
to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 729 (2006) [hereinafter Glicksman, Mutation].
103
Local governments also enacted smoke control ordinances and laws. Glicksman,
Mutation, supra note 102, at 729-30.
104
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 334 (2008). Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v.
Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 387 (2002); Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000).
105
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1096 n.15 (2011).
106
Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly
533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001).
107
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001).
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benefit plans,108 protection of the security of real estate titles,109 insurance
contracts,110 education, and enforcement of criminal laws.111
It is important to note that though decentralized authority is most
likely to be associated with local or state regulatory control, federal
regulatory authority could be modified to be more or less decentralized
(or fragmented) as well. Some of the same justifications for local or state
regulatory authority may be similarly levied for delegating jurisdiction
over particular substantive areas or regulatory functions to a variety of
disparate federal agencies. Particularized expertise 112 and regulatory
experimentation to promote innovation 113 may lead to the allocation of
federal authority away from a heavily consolidated model toward one with
more decentralized federal jurisdiction.
These expertise and
experimentation rationales tout the effectiveness advantages of
decentralized regulation. The diversity and accountability rationales for
decentralizing regulation to state or local authorities, however, would not
support this second aspect of decentralization.
2. Centralized Authority
Despite the diversity, experimentation, democratic, and expertise
critiques of centralized government, 114 many legislatures and scholars
have increasingly accepted that at least for some regulatory problems,
centralization makes sense.
Centralization can take advantage of
108

California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Const., N.A., Inc., 519
U.S. 316, 330 (1997); New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655-56 (1995).
109
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994).
110
Metrop. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740 (1985).
111
U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
112
See, e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1142 (noting that dispersal of authority
can “harness the unique expertise and competencies of different agencies,” and that these
benefits may justify resulting policy inconsistencies and wasteful redundancy).
113
See Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and Ends of Natural Resources
Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1423 (2011) (noting how decentralized governance
can promote “regulatory experimentation to reduce uncertainty”).
114
See e.g., Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, Unraveling the Central State, But How?,
POLITICAL SCIENCE SERIES, INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES, VIENNA 6 (2003);
available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/530/2/pw_87.pdf (“Centralized government is not well
suited to accommodate diversity. Ecological conditions may vary from area to area. . . .
Preferences of citizens may also vary sharply across regions within a state, and if one
takes such heterogeneity into account, the optimal level of authority may be lower than
economies of scale dictate.”); Dornbos, supra note 94, at 17 (“[O]ver-centralized
approaches to environmental regulation are inflexible and do not adequately account for
local environmental conditions.”); ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 259, 263 (Terry L.
Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997) (arguing that a centralized approach to
environmental justice issues would be unresponsive to local conditions and needs).
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economies of scale that are forfeited if regulatory authority is dispersed.115
Some have argued, for example, that certain government functions, such
as research or standard setting, should be centralized at the federal level
because of the economies of scale of a single authority administering the
function.116 This is obviously an argument premised on the comparatively
greater administrative efficiency of centralized regulation.
In addition, authority may be best centrally allocated at the federal
level because of the national character of the issues involved or because of
collective action concerns. Some regulatory matters have national
footprints that are best addressed by a federal authority. These might
include immigration policy, 117 pension plan administration, 118 protection
of intellectual property rights,119 protection of union-related advocacy,120
or control of activities on the high seas,121 such as maritime commerce.122
In environmental law and other contexts, some harms may cross
jurisdictional lines, necessitating more centralized regulatory control to
prevent or manage interstate spillovers.123 Trade wars among the states124
and state product labeling requirements 125 have been characterized as
other kinds of activity that generates interstate spillovers that justify
centralized federal regulation. Similarly, state public utility regulators
have adopted policies designed to benefit in-state interests at the expense
of outsiders.126 In addition, states can export economic burdens to other
115

O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1680.
See, e.g., Esty, Environmental Federalism, supra note 6, at, 614; Daniel C. Esty,
Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1562 (1999)
(discussing value of economies of scale through consolidation of scientific or analytic
work needed for environmental regulation); Adler, supra note 96, at 148.
117
See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of
Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 423 (2009).
118
See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 838-39 (1997).
119
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225. 231 (1964).
120
See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 76 (2008).
121
See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 233 (1986).
122
See U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 103 (2000); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457
U.S. 668, 674-75 (1982).
123
Adler, supra note 96, at 139; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY, AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 11 (Richard L. Revesz et al. eds., 2000); Daniel A. Farber,
Climate Adaptation and Federalism: Mapping the Issues, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE &
ENERGY L. 259, 266 (2009).
124
See Johnsen, supra note 99, at 449.
125
See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and Administrative
Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 607, 666 (1985).
126
See Amy L. Stein, The Tipping Point of Federalism, 45 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2012) [MS at 37].
116
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jurisdictions if they regulate the sale of products that produce local harms
but that are manufactured (and produce employment and economic
benefits) in other states. 127 In these contexts, centralized regulatory
structures may be more effective than decentralized regulation.128 Finally,
James Madison and others have argued that centralized regulation has
comparative fairness advantages because of its ability to promote uniform
treatment of similarly situated entities regardless of location, and to
temper the ability of self-interested factions to control the levers of power
to the disadvantage of less powerful groups or interests. 129 Thus,
centralization may promote equity among those affected by government
programs by treating similarly situated entities alike.
In addition, much of American federal environmental law is premised
on averting a “race to the bottom” from decentralized governance, in
which local jurisdictions compete with each other by progressively
lowering environmental standards. 130 Under this dynamic, individual
states have incentives to lower standards to compete for industry whether
or not other states do the same, even though the states as a collective
would be better off not doing so. 131 Congress invoked the undesirable
specter of a race to the bottom when, in 1977, it amended the Clean Air
Act. A House report warned that “[i]f there is no Federal policy, States
may find themselves forced into a bidding war to attract new industry by
reducing pollution standards.”132 Similarly, the Supreme Court, in Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association,133 characterized
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,134 also adopted in 1977,
127

See Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on
Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate
Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 599-600 (2008).
128
See Stewart, supra note 6 at 1215 (discussing how interstate “spillover[s] ... generate
conflicts and welfare losses not easily remedied under a decentralized regime”).
129
See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, FEDERALIST NO. 10 56 (defining faction as citizens “united
and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community”);
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note
123, at 11 (“[E]nvironmental interests are often underrepresented at the local level and
centralized regulation may . . . ensur[e] that a broad spectrum of interests is represented”).
130
Kirsten Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “to
the Bottom”? 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997); Peter D. Swire, The Race of Laxity and the
Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in
Environmental Law, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 67 (1996).
131
If other states do not lower standards, an individual state is in a better position to
attract industry, while if other states lower standards, then the state must act in a similar
manner to compete effectively.
132
H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 152 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1231.
133
452 U.S. 264 (1981).
134
30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1328 (2006).
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as a response “to a congressional finding that nationwide ‘surface mining
and reclamation standards are essential in order to insure that competition
in interstate commerce among sellers of coal produced in different States
will not be used to undermine the ability of the several States to improve
and maintain adequate standards on coal mining operations within their
borders.’” 135 Such a dynamic has been noted in other substantive
jurisdictions as well.136
In some instances, Congress has chosen to centralize authority for only
a particular governmental function, or to centralize authority incrementally
over time on a function-by-function basis, as it did in adopting air and
water pollution control laws. Beginning in the 1950s, the federal
government enhanced its responsibility for performing certain functions in
halting air and water pollution before others. At first, Congress imposed
greater centralization of information-gathering and dissemination through
passage of laws that funded research into the causes and effects of
pollution. 137 These laws reflected the judgment that the states and
localities lacked the resources to engage in or fund the research needed to
support the adoption of effective pollution control laws.138 Armed with
the information that federally assisted research could provide, the states
and localities were presumed to be able to attack pollution and avoid
public health effects more effectively. In the 1960s, Congress chose to
provide technical and financial assistance to the states, such as by
subsidizing the construction of municipal sewage treatment works. 139
Before long, the federal government increased its role in standard-setting
in a limited range of situations in which state and local control of interstate
135

Hodel, 452 U.S. at 281–82 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1201(g)).
See, e.g., Cary, supra note 6, at 666 (identifying value of centralized regulation for
preventing a race to the bottom in shareholder rights against corporations); Lynn LoPucki
& Sara Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York:
Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom”, 54 VAND. L. REV. 231, 266 (2000)
(bankruptcy law); Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitutionality of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act: Swimming in the Stream of Commerce, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
873, 880 (2012) (health care for the uninsured); Dan T. Coenen, Originalism and the
“Individual Mandate”: Rounding out the Government'
s Case for Constitutionality, 107
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 55, 71 (2012) (same); Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdictional
Competition in Enforcing Noncompetition Agreements: Regulatory Risk Management
and the Race to the Bottom, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1381 (2008); Christopher Paul,
Note, Innovation or a Race to the Bottom? Trust “Modernization” in New Hampshire, 7
PIERCE L. REV. 353, 372 (2009) (discretionary asset protection trusts).
137
See, e.g., An Act to Improve, Strengthen, and Accelerate Programs for the Prevention
and Abatement of Air Pollution, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963).
138
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 89-2170, at 4 (1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3473,
3476; Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, H.R. REP. NO. 87-306,
at 5 (1961), as reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076, 2079 (“The need for a much greater
Federal research effort was consistently recognized during the hearings on the bill.”).
139
Glicksman, Mutation, supra note 102, at 730.
136
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pollution was ineffective.140 Congress subsequently gave EPA and other
federal agencies broad standard-setting authority over a range of
environmental media, including air, water, hazardous and solid waste,
pesticides, and other toxic substances.141
B. Overlapping versus Distinct Authority
Another important dimension takes the form of a spectrum ranging
from overlapping to distinct regulatory authority. As represented in
Figure 4 below, on one extreme, governmental authority over a particular
substantive issue or governmental function may be separate from any
other governmental authority. For the purposes of our analysis, two
governmental entities have overlapping jurisdiction only if (and to the
extent) that both their substantive and functional authority intersect and
affect each other.142 We do not treat agencies which share authority to
regulate a particular subject matter but which perform wholly separate
functions within that area as agencies with overlapping authority.
Geographically distinct authority provides a straightforward illustration of
agencies with different ranges of substantive authority. For example, each
state has sovereign public trust and police powers (including the authority
to manage its public lands and regulate land use) within its particular
geographic boundaries that are largely discrete and exclusive from the
authority of other states to do likewise. 143 Similarly, in federal land
management, the USFS manages designated forests, NPS manages
designated parks, and the BLM manages designated public lands, and in
general each agency has little authority over how the others do so.144
On the other end of the spectrum are regimes in which there are many
governmental institutions with considerable intersecting authority. For
instance, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), NPS, NFS, FWS,
and state wildlife and land agencies share authority over the management
of wildlife. 145 CEQ is granted some authority under the National
Environmental Policy Act over information and planning, FWS engages in
140

See, e.g., Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, H.R. REP. NO. 84-1446,
at 2 (1955), as reprinted in 1955 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3023, 3024.
141
See LAZARUS, supra note 5, at 70-73.
142
Accordingly, the authority of a municipality in Australia to regulate land use is
effectively distinct from the authority of a municipality in Maine to do the same, even
though both regulate land use.
143
See, e.g., Carolina Trucks & Equipment, Inc. v. Volvo Trucks of N. Am., Inc., 492
F.3d 484, 491-92 (4th Cir. 2007) (discussing constraints on extraterritorial application of
the police power).
144
See 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 57, §§ 2:11-2:14, 6:14-6:18 (discussing the
various federal lands systems and the jurisdictions of the agencies that manage them).
145
See 3 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 57, §§ 32:6-32:17 (discussing jurisdiction
of federal and state agencies over wildlife on federal lands).
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planning and standard setting over endangered species pursuant to the
Endangered Species Act, while federal and state land management
agencies have planning, implementation and enforcement authority.146
Figure 4. Prototypical Examples of Distinct and Overlapping Authority

Accordingly, although more than one agency may share substantive
authority (e.g., more than one agency has the authority to control wetlands
development), we do not treat that authority as overlapping unless the
agencies perform the same governmental function within that area (e.g.,
shared enforcement authority between federal and state regulators for state
requirements adopted under delegated federal authority). If regulatory
power is fully centralized in one regulator, this dimension does not come
into play. If, however, policymakers decide to divide authority among
more than one entity, this dimension implicates two key questions. The
first is whether authority over a particular resource or regulatory problem
(e.g., water pollution) should be divided up so that, even though there are
multiple regulators, each is responsible for addressing a distinct
component of the larger problem (e.g., one controls point source and
another controls nonpoint source pollution, or one controls pollution by
non-nuclear materials while another has sole authority over nuclear
materials).147 The second is whether regulatory functions should overlap
(e.g., if one agency is authorized to review and, if appropriate, veto, the
146

See generally 2 & 3 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 57, ch. 17, 29, 32.
See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 864 (2006)
(discussing jurisdictional overlap, in which agencies have “regulatory authority over the
same individuals or institutions, with regard to the same or related issues”).
147
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issuance of permits by another) or instead comprise distinct mandates
(e.g., if one agency sets standards, while another applies those standards in
the context of resolving individual permit applications).148
1. Distinct Authority
Legislatures have long adopted and scholars have promoted the idea
that authority over a particular regulatory problem is best allocated to a
single or few regulators. Such a perspective is primarily based on an
explicit or implicit “matching principle”— that legislatures should match
each regulatory problem (or aspect of a regulatory problem) to the single
authority that can best address that problem.149 Advocates of the matching
principle urge, for example, that environmental regulatory authority
generally should be vested in “the political jurisdiction that comes closest
to matching the geographic area affected by a particular externality.”150
In addition, scholars have identified various weaknesses of a
regulatory system with overlapping regulatory authority. Some criticize
overlapping governance because regulator accountability to the public
may be diminished in a regulatory system where authority intersects.151
Agencies with shared authority may shirk their responsibilities, blaming
co-regulators for program failures.152 The resulting inaction may unfairly
impose risks or costs on those affected by the unregulated activity.
Similar risks and costs may not occur in jurisdictions in which at least one
regulator with shared authority is more diligent or conscientious in the
exercise of that authority.
Others have posited that overlapping
jurisdiction can lead to a lack of finality in the regulatory process.153
One of the more common criticisms of overlapping jurisdiction is that
it is wasteful and inefficient, both for regulators and regulated entities.
The government’s “transaction costs” of regulating increase if multiple

148

See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), 1342(b) (2006) (delegating standard-setting function
to EPA and permitting function to states meeting certain minimum requirements).
149
See HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1996).
150
Id. at 48. See also Adler, supra note 96, at 133.
151
Robert Schapiro, From Dualist Federalism to Interactive Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J.
1, 17 (2006); Robert A. Schapiro, Monophonic Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 811,
812-13 (2008); Engel, supra note 7, at 162.
152
Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1187; Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap,
Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statutory Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 288
(2011) (“Regulatory overlap thus may lead each regulator to shirk . . . within an area of
overlapping jurisdiction.”).
153
Engel, supra note 7, at 162.
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agencies perform tasks that could have been handled by a single agency.154
Efforts to coordinate among multiple regulators can address redundancy,
but can themselves be costly.155 Consolidation of authority therefore may
make sense within a governmental level. As the proposed reorganization
of the six agencies with jurisdiction over small businesses discussed in the
introduction to this Article illustrates, such consolidation is often seen as a
way to minimize redundancy and duplication of effort, thereby promoting
administrative efficiency.156
For regulated entities, multiple bodies of regulation require tracking
and complying with disparate and potentially conflicting sets of
obligations.157 Overlapping regulation also can reduce certainty and thus
effectiveness if the relationships among the mandates of different
regulators are unclear.158 Some suggest it be fundamentally unfair if an
entity is regulated by multiple government bodies and potentially subject
to various different standards. 159 Some also claim that overlapping
authority can lead to over-regulation where “numerous regulators are
confronted with a more particularized project or proposal with localized
and discernible effects.”160 These scholars consider overlapping authority
ineffective “because it may result in the development of inefficient
standards, both through the introduction of regulatory goals other than
externality elimination, and through interference with the free movement
of firms through government over-appropriation of fixed capital assets.”161
Others, however, have asserted that overlapping jurisdiction can lead
to under-regulation, an unintended result of what Professor William
154

Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1150. Freeman and Rossi cite as an example the
shared responsibility of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in
enforcing the federal antitrust laws. Id. at 1146. See also Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping
and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 214
(discussing duplicative monitoring and enforcement costs).
155
Aagaard, supra note 152, at 288; Vermeule, supra note 95, at 24 (discussing increased
costs of communication among agencies that accompany the creation of dense networks
of related agencies).
156
William W. Buzbee, State GHG Regulation, Federal Climate Change Legislation, and
the Preemption Sword, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE CHANGE & ENERGY L. 23, 53 (2009)
(referring to “additional cops on the beat” ).
157
Marisam, supra note 20, at 223 (referring to “the burdens on regulated entities that
must comply with two agencies’ regulations”); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1150.
158
See Ahdieh, supra note 147, at 897.
159
Cf. Laura E. Little, Empowerment through Restraint: Reverse Preemption or Hybrid
Lawmaking?, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 955, 984 (2009) (referring to the “problems of
legal instability and unfairness resulting from multiple regulations on one wrong”).
160
See Buzbee, supra note 83, at 349. See also James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon,
Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1, 11–12 (2000).
161
Engel, supra note 7, at 165-66.
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Buzbee has dubbed the creation of a “regulatory commons,”162 especially
when the regulated problem or harm is large-scale and broadly
dispersed. 163 Buzbee attributes this to high information costs of
developing a regulatory response, limited credit for regulators, bias toward
the regulatory status quo, and regulator risk aversion.164 The result may be
that although multiple regulators have authority to address a particular
problem, regulatory gaps develop as each assumes or hopes that others are
addressing it.165 Buzbee suggests that reducing the number of potential
regulators and/or combining the regulatory authority of particular
regulators could lessen the incentives for regulatory inaction in some
contexts. 166 Thus, some argue that distinct regulation may be more
effective than overlapping regulation.
Other collective action problems may support distinct regulation.
Congress adopted exclusive federal jurisdiction over standard-setting for
nuclear waste disposal facilities, transportation of hazardous waste,
transportation and disposal of other forms of nuclear material, and
management of biomedical waste based on concerns that state and local
governments would adopt constraints on locally unwanted activities with
broader, more diffuse social benefits. 167 For example, Congress passed
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980168 to distribute the
environmental burdens of the disposal of nuclear waste more equitably.169
Though obviously related, at least in some cases the centralization and
overlap dimensions do not necessarily present the same choices to
policymakers, and moves along the two dimensions may have different
effects on regulatory authority. Typically, a centralization of substantive
regulatory power results in a decrease in overlap. Federal deregulation
that provides for unitary state regulation would decrease overlap in
authority, just as federal ceiling preemption of state law (under which state
162

Buzbee, supra note 7, at 5–6.
See Buzbee, supra note 83, at 348 (noting incentives of multiple potential regulators
for regulatory inattention, especially for cross-jurisdictional problems).
164
Buzbee, supra note 182, at 30–36.
165
Ahdieh, supra note 147, at 897-98 (noting the costs of intersystemic regulation,
including shirking, diminished oversight, free-riding, loss of incentives to regulate
carefully, and tendency to blame co-regulators).
166
See Buzbee, supra note 7, at 51.
167
See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 5125 (preempting some state regulation of hazardous waste
packaging and transportation); Tennessee v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 326 F.3d 729,
730–31 (6th Cir. 2003) (describing federal hazardous materials transportation legislation
as “an effort to create a coherent approach to . . . problems posed by the interstate
transportation of hazardous material”).
168
42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b–2021d (2000).
169
See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 127, at 600-01.
163
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governments are barred from regulating more stringently than the federal
government)170 would. For example, in addition to being a shift toward
centralization, the creation of certain federal authority over automobile
tailpipe emission standards, 171 pesticides, 172 and nuclear waste 173
represented movements away from overlap by preempting supplemental
state standards, even if they were more stringent than the federal
standards.
On the other hand, a federal law establishing a new federal agency
with only floor preemption authority — under which state authorities may
adopt more stringent regulation than their federal counterpart — would
result in an increase in centralization as well as overlap. 174 Moreover,
decreases or increases in overlap may occur not only over substantive
jurisdiction but also over particular regulatory functions. For example,
increasing limitations on or barring the authority of federal agencies to
overfile — to commence enforcement action against permit holders in
addition to state agency enforcement 175 — would decrease overlap in
enforcement functions.176
2. Overlapping Authority
Overlapping authority has its proponents. A large and growing
literature identifies a variety of effectiveness and accountability benefits
associated with a regulatory system with concurrent regulatory authority.
170

See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1551 (2007) (discussing arguments
for and against ceiling or “unitary federal choice” preemption that “eliminates
institutional diversity.”)
171
See 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (2006) (generally prohibiting the adoption or enforcement of
state tailpipe emission standards, but allowing EPA to waive prohibition by granting a
waiver to California).
172
See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2006) (preempting state regulation of labeling and packaging
of pesticide products).
173
See supra note 167. Congress adopted exclusive federal jurisdiction in this area based
on concerns that state and local governments would adopt constraints on locally
unwanted activities with broader, more diffuse social benefits. See 49 U.S.C. § 5125
(2006).
174
Thus, many of the federal pollution statutes provide for floor preemption, retaining
state authority to adopt regulations that are more stringent than their federal counterparts.
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2006).
175
See infra note 272 and accompanying text (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of overlapping enforcement authority).
176
Similarly, in adopting the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Congress chose to preempt all
state regulation of the manner in which nuclear power plants operate, but to retain state
authority to decide whether to bar issuance of operating permits based on economic
reasons (such as the affordability of the energy produced by nuclear plants). Pacific Gas
and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
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Some scholars have reasoned that an approach that minimizes overlap and
consolidates decision making in a single or few authorities can have a
number of negative consequences. In addition to pointing to the
implausibility of eliminating already extensive regulatory segmentation,177
many scholars have detailed the undesirability of doing so.178
Some scholars argue that the redundancy that occurs through
overlapping jurisdiction can be advantageous. 179 Though much of this
literature relates to allocation of authority between the federal government
and the states and localities,180 the same dynamic applies to overlap within
a particular level of government. To begin with, although overlap can
create inefficiencies, as described above,181 it can enhance the prospects
for effective regulation. The key idea is that concurrent jurisdiction
increases the likelihood of regulatory action because there are more actors
with authority to regulate.182 Should one regulatory entity backslide or fail
to regulate, others would be available to fill the gap. 183 Concurrent
jurisdiction thus may be particularly valuable for regulatory contexts184
where the costs of under-regulation are high, such as those that seek to
address high-cost or irreversible effects or the management of

177

Buzbee, supra note 7, at 51.
Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 7; Buzbee, supra note 7, at 51; Adelman & Engel, supra
note 7, at 1800-01; Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in
the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1417 (1999).
179
Jared Snyder & Jonathan Binder, The Changing Climate of Cooperative Federalism:
The Dynamic Role of the States in A National Strategy to Combat Climate Change, 27
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'
Y 231, 252 (2009).
180
See, e.g., Blake Hudson, Reconstituting Land-Use Federalism to Address Transitory
and Perpetual Disasters: The Bimodal Federalism Framework, 2011 B.Y.U. L REV.
1991, 2037.
181
See supra notes 154 to 266 and accompanying text.
182
Buzbee, supra note 156, at 53.
183
See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1138 (arguing that redundancy provides
insurance against a single agency’s failure); Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods
and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 354
(2011) (arguing that overlap “opens space” for each regulator “to prod and plea with one
another when the danger . . . is one of government underreach”); Michael Doran,
Legislative Organization and Administrative Redundancy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1815, 1819
(2011) (arguing that redundancy can “provid[e] an important failsafe”).
184
Professor Biber has argued that the desirable amount of overlap is likely to be highly
contextual, depending on factors such as whether the agencies concerned have goals that
are complementary or in tension with one other, the cultures and professional
backgrounds of agencies and their personnel, and the political context. See Biber, supra
note 51. at 78. The location of the relevant agencies along the other dimensions identified
in this article is also likely to be important, such as whether the agencies have cooperative
or competitive relationships.
178
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nonrenewable resources. 185 Relatedly, concurrent jurisdiction has the
potential to improve decisions and enhance the effectiveness of
government programs by allowing authorities with a range of different
competencies to be brought to bear on a problem.186
The regulatory safety net resulting from overlap also can foster
accountability by indirectly combating interest group capture that may
exist for one governmental entity but not another. 187 As Anne Joseph
O’Connell has noted, “[o]ne interest group generally will find it more
difficult to capture several agencies than a single agency; to wield power
over multiple agencies, interest groups may have to work together, which
is a costly enterprise for the groups.” 188 In addition, agencies with
overlapping subject matter and functional jurisdiction may be more
reluctant to respond favorably to interest group pressure because other
agencies sharing regulatory authority may detect and cast adverse light on
that behavior.189
Both distinct and overlapping authority, therefore, have the potential to
enhance accountability, depending on the circumstances and incentives of
regulators. Distinct authority is better situated to promote accountability if
the primary accountability problem is the tendency of co-regulators to
shirk their responsibilities and to blame co-regulators for program
failures.190 On the other hand, overlapping authority is better designed to
promote accountability if one co-regulator’s likely response to another’s
lack of regulation is not to assign blame, but instead to step into the
regulatory breach, or if capture is a prominent concern. Which account is
more compelling to policymakers may depend on assessments of the
history of the particular regulatory program and social problem in
question, and policymakers’ philosophies about institutional incentives
and behavior.191

185

See Engel, supra note 7, at 179. See also Ewing & Kysar, supra note 183, at 410
(“Overlapping governance mechanisms . . . ensure a fuller and more inclusive
characterization of emerging threats to social and environmental well-being.”).
186
Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing
Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 67-68 (2009).
187
See Engel, supra note 7, at 178-79 (noting that overlap can combat excessive
influence of interest groups that prevents effective regulation).
188
O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1677. Likewise, agencies with broader jurisdiction are
harder to capture than agencies with narrower ones because “all of the covered industries
must bid against one another to capture the regulator.” Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 3,
at 33.
189
Aagaard, supra note 152, at 294 (2011).
190
See supra notes 151 to 152 and accompanying text.
191
See infra note 210 and accompanying text.

30-Mar-13]

Harvard Journal on Legislation

37

Some also argue that overlapping authority may provide space for
initial regulatory strategies by one entity that can serve as a proving
ground.192 These commenters contend that a dispersed and overlapping
regulatory system, such as the delegation of authority to the states
allowing the adoption of pollution controls more stringent than federal
standards,193 may allow for a diversity of tailored approaches, promoting
innovative management experimentation and creating the opportunity for
learning about the advantages and disadvantages of particular management
strategies. 194 According to these scholars, concurrent authority can
promote innovation by providing regulators close access to information
about the efficacy of alternative management strategies based on their
observations of the experience of co-regulators.195 As detailed in Part IV,
however, these arguments touting the diversity benefits of overlapping
jurisdiction appear to be erroneously conflating it with decentralized
authority.196
C. Independent versus Coordinated Authority
A final dimension for characterizing the allocation of authority focuses
on the extent of formal or informal coordination among authorities with
jurisdiction over a particular regulatory problem or government function.
For this dimension, the key question is how much multiple regulatory
authorities communicate, coordinate, and collaborate in addressing any
particular substantive problem or in performing a delegated governmental
function. As illustrated in Figure 5, on one end of the spectrum 197 is a
regulatory framework in which governmental entities are highly
independent and isolated in their regulatory activities. At the other end is
a regulatory relationship characterized by close agency collaboration and
regulatory coordination. Accordingly, this dimension assumes some level
of decentralization. It may come into play whether or not there is
192

Carlson, supra note 7, at 1100-01.
The Clean Air Act, for example, authorizes EPA to adopt technology-based emission
controls for certain sources and pollutants, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411-7412 (2006)), but it allows
states to adopt more stringent emission control standards in most areas. Id. § 7416.
194
Adelman & Engel, supra note 7, at 1820-21 (2008); Ahdieh, supra note 147, at 892.
195
Engel, supra note 7, at 161, 179 (noting that “regulatory activity at one level . . . may
be a stepping stone to regulation at the governing level that dual federalism proponents
label ‘optimal’”).
196
See infra notes 298 to 307 and accompanying text.
197
As indicated infra, at notes 216 to 224 and accompanying text, it is more difficult to
conceptualize the coordination-independence dimension as a simple spectrum ranging
from greater to lesser degrees of coordination because coordination can be measured in
different ways, including the frequency, duration, scope, and voluntariness of
coordination. It is typically simpler to determine with respect to a given substantive area
or government function whether the authority to address that area or function is
centralized or decentralized, or distinct or overlapping.
193
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jurisdictional overlap among authorities, and, if so, whether that overlap is
substantive and/or functional. 198 Coordination among agencies with
distinct jurisdictional charges is possible, just as it is among those with
overlapping responsibilities.
Figure 5. Independent versus Coordinated Authority

1. Coordinated Authority
In response to the considerable incentives and effects of regulatory
fragmentation, some scholars and regulatory actors have called for more
coordination among regulatory authorities. Indeed, coordination exists or
has been proposed over a wide range of substantive jurisdictions, such as
natural resources, 199 food safety, 200 and bioterrorism. 201 Though
198

If regulatory power is concentrated in one entity, the issue of whether that authority
should be exercised in independent or coordinated fashion is moot (although the degree
of coordination among employees or offices within a single agency can differ).
199
Many inter-jurisdictional natural resource management coordination regimes have
been
created.
See,
e.g.,
Chesapeake
Bay
Program,
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/index.aspx (last visited October 25, 2011); California
Bay-Delta Authority (CBDA), http://calwater.ca.gov/calfed/ oversight/CBDA/index.html
(last visited October 25, 2011). For additional examples, see Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 189, 217–18 (2002).
200
See e.g., Title II, FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat.
3885 (2011) (requiring the Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human
Services, Agriculture, Commerce, and EPA to coordinate in information collection,
analysis, and reporting on foodborne illnesses, outbreak response planning, and technical
assistance to local governments).
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eliminating fragmentation or overlap may be implausible or even
undesirable, many scholars have emphasized the value of agency dialogue
and collaboration to reduce fragmentation’s adverse effects. 202
Coordination can increase the effectiveness of government action by
promoting exchanges of ideas and the pooling of the expertise of different
agencies.203 Although efforts to coordinate require the investment of time
and resources that need not be incurred when agencies act independently,
some claim that these costs may be more than offset by reductions in
duplication of effort and inconsistent action, so that coordination can
result in a net administrative efficiency gain.204
Scholars also argue that coordination can promote accountability by
combating drift, shirking, and free-riding through facilitation of interagency monitoring. 205 Coordination also can promote accountability by
providing governmental authorities the opportunity and even duty to
review and serve as a check on other authorities in the performance of
delegated governmental functions, thereby reducing the risk of regulator
capture. 206 Each regulatory authority can essentially serve as an
accountability check on the others.207 Finally, the coordinated exercise of
multi-jurisdictional authority can promote fairness by minimizing the
imposition of inconsistent or redundant demands on regulated entities.208
201

For example, the Drinking Water Security and Safety Amendments, adopted as part of
the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-188 §§ 401- 403, 116 Stat. 594, 682-87 (2002), requires coordination, led by
EPA, to abate and respond to threats to drinking water infrastructure security. See
generally Steven D. Shermer, The Drinking Water Security and Safety Amendments of
2002: Is America’s Drinking Water Infrastructure Safer Four Years Later?, 24 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 355, 395-96 (2005-2006).
202
See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING AGENCIES TO WORK TOGETHER: THE PRACTICE
AND THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP (1998) (providing recommendations for
fostering interagency collaboration); Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 7, at 66-67 (discussing
a system of “weak ties” for alleviating the effects of fragmentation).
203
Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1185 (noting potential for coordination to improve
decisionmaking by adding data and expertise and diversifying perspectives).
204
Id. at 1183.
205
Id. at 1189 (noting that coordination can “control drift by providing structured
opportunities for agencies to account to each other”).
206
See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1186 (“Agencies will be harder to isolate and
neutralize to the extent that their approaches are aligned.”).
207
Affording government officials access to information on the performance of other
regulators can provide increased capacity to pressure those other regulators to comply
with regulatory requirements. See Camacho, supra note 186, at 74-75.
208
Cf. Thomas McInerney, Putting Regulation Before Responsibility: Towards Binding
Norms of Corporate Social Responsibility, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 171, 195 (2007)
(discussing “efforts of state regulators to coordinate their regulatory approaches and
ensure equitable treatment in international negotiations”); Maribeth Wilt-Seibert,
Unemployment Compensation for Employees of Educational Institutions: How State
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Recently, a number of scholars and government officials have
examined the various characteristics of interagency coordination.209 For
several reasons, its definition is unsettled.
Different schools of
organizational theory seek to explain institutional coordination, and their
definitions differ from one another.210 In addition, coordination can take
any number of forms. Coordination can be formal or informal.211 It can
be long or short-term, and frequent or occasional. Coordination can be
voluntary and cooperative, 212 or mandated by legislative or executive
action.213 The National Environmental Policy Act,214 discussed below,215
is a prominent example of mandated, formal federal interagency
coordination, but primarily only over agency planning and informationgathering functions.
Coordination also can be understood as a spectrum that ranges from
less active inter-jurisdictional relationships to those that require significant
synchronization. 216 The range of coordination activities includes mere
communication of adopted agency actions; 217 creation of formal or

Courts Have Created Variations on Federally Mandated Statutory Language, 29 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 585, 611 (1995) (encouraging coordination among states to ensure
consistency and equitable treatment of similarly situated employees with respect to
unemployment compensation benefits).
209
See e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4; Bradley, supra note 8; DeShazo & Freeman,
supra note 7.
210
Gregg Macey, Environmental Crisis and the Paradox of Organizing, 2011 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 2063, 2113 (2011) (mentioning different definitions of coordination in game theory,
resource exchange, contingency theory, and transaction cost economics, among others).
211
See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1156 (describing the presence of considerable
informal coordination that may or may not involve explicit communication between
agencies). See also Vermeule, supra note 95, at 22 (referring to “myriad” devices and
mechanisms for achieving coordination, ranging from conversations to formal
interagency memoranda of agreement); Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 3, at 43 (same).
212
See CRAIG W. THOMAS, BUREAUCRATIC LANDSCAPES: INTERAGENCY COOPERATION
AND THE PRESERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY 24 (2003) (describing non-mandatory
interagency cooperation). Professor Marisam has identified three kinds of benefits that
agencies may derive from cooperation with other agencies: the power they derive from
influencing other agencies’ actions, the reputational benefits that may flow from
contributing to the solution to another agency’s problem, and reciprocation from other
agencies in the future. Marisam, supra note 20, at 7.
213
See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1157.
214
42 U.S.C. 4321-4347.
215
See infra Part IV.A.3.
216
See Bradley, supra note 8, at 757-757 (describing spectrum of interagency
coordination, including advisory, mandated interaction, veto power, and lobbying power).
217
Publication of public notices by government agencies in the Federal Register,
https://www.federalregister.gov/, may be the most recognizable example at the federal
level.
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informal fora for inter-jurisdictional discussion; 218 providing to other
governmental authorities an opportunity to comment on or respond to
potential or proposed agency actions, whether discretionary 219 or
mandatory; 220 required consideration of or response to the comments or
recommendations of other governmental authorities;221 the harmonization
of agency activities through voting arrangements or mutual/consensus
agreement; 222 and providing a governmental authority a de facto or
express veto power over the activity of another authority.223 Of course,
even each of these types of coordination can vary considerably. For
example, inter-jurisdictional agreements can range in scope, strength, and
duration.224
Because of this multiplicity of factors, it may at times be challenging
to characterize one regulatory program as more or less coordinated than
another. To be sure, infrequent and short-term communication typically
would be less coordinated than continued and enduring interaction;
218

Formal examples of these include some functions of federal interagency task forces
such
as
the
Interagency
Climate
Change
Adaptation
Task
Force
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/adaptation),
or
the
National Endowment for the Arts Federal Interagency Task Force
(http://www.nea.gov/news/news11/Task-Force-Announcement.html).
219
See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1157 (describing “discretionary consultation”).
For example, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act provides that when
considering applications for pesticide registration, EPA “may consult” with any other
federal agency. See id.
220
See id.; Bradley, supra note 8, at 750-56 (discussing examples of mandatory agency
consultation requirements); Biber, supra note 8, at 41-60 (same).
221
See Bradley, supra note 8, at 755 (describing how the Federal Power Act requires
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to consider input from fish and wildlife agencies
before approving plans to construct new hydroelectric dams); Freeman & Rossi, supra
note 4, at 1158 (citing EPA’s duty under federal pesticide laws to solicit opinions from
Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human Services before promulgating
regulations).
222
Some international treaties or interstate compacts, such as those that help govern use
of the Colorado River, exemplify relatively robust forms of harmonization over standard
setting. See, e.g., Colorado River Compact of 1922, 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928); Upper
Colorado River Basin Compact, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31 (1949). Other versions focus
primarily on the information-gathering function. See, e.g., Great Lakes Basin Compact,
Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414, 415–17 (1968) (establishing the Great Lakes
Commission to gather information and make non-binding recommendations to member
states).
223
See Bradley, supra note 8, at 755-56 (discussing de facto veto and express veto
powers).
224
CRAIG W. THOMAS, BUREAUCRATIC LANDSCAPES: INTERAGENCY COOPERATION AND
THE PRESERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY 25 (2003) (“[S]pecific cooperative agreements
should be measured in terms of their scope, strength, and duration, not simply their
existence. Scope refers to the range of issues covered. . . . Strength refers to the binding
nature of the agreements, ranging from verbal or tacit agreements to legally binding
documents. Duration refers to the endurance of an agreement.”).
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cooperation on a few issues ordinarily involves less coordination than
cooperation on many issues; and voluntary discussion between agencies
usually would be less coordinated than mandatory consultation. However,
in some circumstances these various factors may point in different
directions. For example, voluntary weekly meetings between agencies to
discuss issues of common concern may be considered more or less
coordinated than a program that requires an agency to solicit and integrate
comments from another annually.
Similarly, a short-term interjurisdictional agreement involving a wide range of problems may be more
or less coordinated than a long-term one on a narrow issue. For purposes
of this Article, however, we do not seek to devise a formula weighting
these various factors for calculating where a particular government
program rests along the coordination/independence dimension. Instead,
our point is that policymakers should consider whether the goals of a
decentralized regime, whether distinct or overlapping, would best be
promoted by requiring coordination or allowing independent exercise of
authority. Part of that assessment, of course, will entail consideration of
various forms of coordination, each of which will have its own set of costs
and benefits.
2. Independent Authority
Although coordination of regulatory efforts has theoretical
effectiveness and administrative efficiency advantages, many of the calls
for collaboration and the formation of coordinating regimes are reflexive,
without any additional discussion of the costs of such additional regimes.
Adding layers of consultation and collaboration requirements to an
overlapping regulatory landscape will undoubtedly divert already limited
agency resources, and it is worth considering whether the benefits of
particular communications or collaborations among authorities are worth
these opportunity costs. Particularly if they are not designed properly,
efforts at collaboration may not be worth the cost.225
Moreover, both experience and a notable literature suggest loss of
regulatory effectiveness through close agency coordination, particularly in
the management of complex and uncertain regulatory problems. At least
some inter-jurisdictional collaborations in the past have failed to provide
meaningful opportunities for cross-jurisdictional information sharing and
collaboration.226 In discussing the benefits of divided regulatory authority,
225

Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1182 (noting substantial “up-front investments
required to coordinate agencies,” and that giving one agency veto power may elevate
costs substantially by requiring extensive negotiations).
226
See Camacho, supra note 186, at 30-36 (analyzing inter-jurisdictional collaborations
for managing resources in the Great Lakes and criticizing these efforts as serving as “yet
another layer of fragmentation to the already disjointed regulatory landscape”).
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numerous scholars have focused on the value of inter-jurisdictional
competition in promoting socially optimal environmental regulation.
Richard Revesz has argued in an influential article that interstate
competition for industry should produce “an efficient allocation of
industrial activity among the states.”227 Jonathan Adler argues that interjurisdictional competition “can encourage policy innovation as
policymakers seek to meet the economic, environmental, and other
demands of their constituents,” while allowing competing authorities to
act as environmental ‘laboratories’ developing new and improved ways of
addressing environmental concerns.” 228 Competition among authorities
may be a contest for political credit, resources, or additional regulatory
responsibilities. Such competition is premised on the regulatory autonomy
and independence of individual regulators from the activities of other
government authorities. Though these competition benefits are often
ascribed as a feature of decentralization,229 it is the fact that regulators are
acting independently rather than in coordinated fashion that yields the
competitive dynamic.
In addition, some forms of coordination may lead to an “anticommons” problem. 230 The most acute forms of coordination, such as
required harmonization of agency activities, include requiring all
governmental authorities with jurisdiction over a particular problem to
agree to a particular regulatory strategy. 231 Some scholars have argued
that a consensus decision rule can encourage holdouts and mutual vetoes
that can result in the underutilization of resources.232
Though arguments promoting regulatory independence are typically
raised in conjunction with arguments promoting the devolution of
regulatory authority to localities or states,233 regulatory independence can
be valuable even among federal agencies. In the context of analyzing the
possible reorganization of the governmental provision of national security
intelligence, Anne Joseph O’Connell has argued that competition among
227

Revesz, supra note 6, at 1211-12. See also Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative
Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV.
959, 961 (2007) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s modern federalism jurisprudence
“privileges state sovereignty in order to promote efficiency and intergovernmental
competition.”).
228
Adler, supra note 96, at 134.
229
See e.g., Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 710-11 (noting that centralization can diminish
inter-agency competition and prevent efficient performance).
230
See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 622-26 (1998).
231
See supra notes 217 to 223 and accompanying text.
232
See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J.
549, 590 (2001); Heller, supra note 230, at 622-26.
233
See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 7, at 1102.
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even federal authorities in some instances may be preferable to
coordination because it may prevent “pernicious” collusion, encourage a
creative “race to the top,” motivate correction of other agencies’ mistakes,
and facilitate adaption to changing conditions.234
In addition, O’Connell asserts that providing multiple governmental
entities with regulatory authority over a particular problem can help
prevent “group think”235 and increase the diversity of viewpoints.236 Any
such benefits result from the existence of multiple governmental
authorities acting autonomously. Finally, assuming alternative
mechanisms for obtaining information about the performance of other
regulators, inter-jurisdictional competition also may serve as a source of
accountability. Regulators may have substantial incentives to vigilantly
review and challenge the actions of other intersecting authorities, 237
particularly when there are inter-jurisdictional spillovers or attempts by an
authority to obtain a competitive advantage.
As in the case of the distinctness/overlap dimension,238 proponents of
both coordination and independence have identified accountability
benefits. Both accounts note the potential for one agency armed with
information about what others are doing to serve as a check on the failures
of co-regulators. Whether one finds one account or the other more
convincing in a particular context may turn on a number of factors,
including what is the particular governmental function at issue. It also
may depend on whether this checking function is likely to be best
promoted by the relatively greater access to information about the
activities of co-regulators among coordinating agencies, or by the
potentially greater willingness of competing as opposed to coordinating
agencies to call other agencies to account for drift, shirking, capture, or
other forms of regulatory failure.
In some circumstances, then, maintaining the independence of
agencies and limiting cooperation may be more important for managing
234

O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1677-78.
See IRVING JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK 8-9 (1972) (coining the term “groupthink”
as a product of cohesive ingroups “when the members’ strivings for unanimity override
their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.”). See also Susan
Cain, The Rise of the New Groupthink, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2012 (citing research
showing that brainstorming sessions do not stimulate creativity).
236
O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1676. Though Professor O’Connell focuses on this as a
benefit of regulatory redundancy, it is more properly understood as a feature of whether
the applicable regulators are independent from each other.
237
Cf. Engel, supra note 7, at 178–79 (discussing how intersecting agencies can promote
accountability by monitoring each other’s compliance).
238
See supra notes 151-203 and accompanying text.
235
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certain regulatory problems than a heavily collaborative model. Most
prominently, depending on the governmental function at issue, regulator
independence may be more consistent with (and better promote) the
redundancy benefits of overlapping jurisdiction than a heavily coordinated
model. Such a circumstance might exist during periods of change, 239
where there is considerable uncertainty, harm may be catastrophic, and
prevention or mitigation of such harm by one of the independent
authorities is possible (for example, in prevention of terrorism attack or
natural disaster).240
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FUNCTIONAL JURISDICTION AND THE
DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY
As one scholar has noted, “arguing that lines of organization are
entirely inconsequential is likely to be as difficult as arguing that lines of
geographic jurisdiction are inconsequential.” 241 A variety of academic
disciplines suggest “that formal lines of authority, jurisdictional limits, and
formal hierarchical arrangements should be expected to change how legal
mandates are carried out.” 242 This Article focuses on two aspects of
agency institutional structure that we believe have not been fully
appreciated in the literature: the role of functional jurisdiction in
allocating agency authority, introduced in Part II, and the existence of (and
relationships among) three different dimensions of governmental authority
introduced in Part III.
Section A below documents the neglect of functional jurisdiction in
both academic and political considerations of agency structure and
illustrates why it is important to differentiate between substantive and
functional jurisdiction in allocating government authority. Section B
substantiates the tendency of policymakers and scholars to conflate the
three dimensions of authority and analyzes how the failure to fully
appreciate the effects of allocating authority along each of the dimensions
may defeat the goals of government programs or prevent them from
realizing their full potential. The conclusion that follows provides some
tentative recommendations for fully integrating functional and
dimensional considerations into the analysis of government structure.

239

Ahdieh, supra note 147, at 890 (arguing for “intersystemic regulation” that minimizes
inertia and promotes regulatory competition and learning, especially “amidst transition.”).
240
Cf. Marisam, supra note 20, at 224 (touting the benefits of redundancy “where there
are potentially catastrophic or irreversible risks from agency failures”).
241
Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, “Securing” the Nation: Law, Politics, and Organization
at the Federal Security Agency, 1939-1953, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 644 (2009).
242
Id. According to Cuellar, these include institutional sociology, political economy, and
social psychology. Id.
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A. The Importance of Appreciating Functional Jurisdiction
The literature on government organization and structure is a rich one.
A few commenters have noted problems with organizing administrative
agencies primarily based on substantive jurisdictional authority. 243
Relatively little attention has been paid, however, to the possibility of
allocating agency authority along functional as opposed to substantive
lines. Only a few scholars have identified the possible division of
authority along functional lines 244 or noted the relative scarcity of
functional divisions of government authority. 245 This tendency to
emphasize substance rather than function is reflected in comparisons of
centralized and decentralized, overlapping and distinct, and coordinated
and independent organizational structures.
Consideration of functional jurisdiction expands the options available
in crafting government programs to deal with social problems. Awareness
of the option of allocating jurisdiction functionally provides a more
nuanced framework for analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of
alternative structural designs. Moreover, by choosing to structure the
exercise of various functions at a different point along each of the three
dimensions, it may be possible for policymakers to harness the advantages
of certain dimensions when they are particularly prominent for certain
governmental functions while minimizing the shortcomings if they exist
for others. Through the prism of governmental function, legislators can
better understand and then design allocations of authority to promote
chosen regulatory goals.

243

See, e.g., Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, Reinventing the EPA to
Conform with the New American Environmentality, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 6-12
(1998) (discussing problematic development of EPA’s media-specific enforcement
approach); Peter J. Fontaine, EPA’s Multimedia Enforcement Strategy: The Struggle to
Close the Environmental Compliance Circle, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 31, 50 (1993)
noting that EPA’s organizational structure and culture have produced separate program
offices with their own parochial agendas). See also Matthew C. Waxman, National
Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV. 289, 350 (2012) (suggesting
reform of “specific counterterrorism intelligence functions, to set policy-appropriate
balances of centralization and localization”).
244
See, e.g., Geltman & Skroback, supra note 243, at 10 (discussing functional
organization at EPA); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1145 (discussing “overlapping
agency functions . . . (as when two agencies share enforcement authority over the same
malfeasance)” ).
245
David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs,
113 YALE L.J. 955, 988 (2004). For further discussion analogizing the issues involved in
agency organization to those in organizing business entities, and citing some of the
literature on the industrial organization of firms, see Vermeule, supra note 104, at 21;
Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 3, at 19.
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1. Functional Jurisdiction and the Centralization-Decentralization
Dimension
Though there is an extensive literature on the advantages and
disadvantages of centralized and decentralized governmental authority,
this literature largely neglects the significance of functional jurisdiction.
Academics frequently offer arguments for or against centralized authority
without considering whether the persuasiveness of those arguments differs
depending on the agency function involved.246 Similarly, when creating or
reorganizing governmental institutions, legislatures often give short shrift
to differentiating based on governmental function the assessment of
possible benefits of creating more or less centralization.247
The failure to consider on a function-by-function basis whether
centralized or decentralized authority is appropriate may lead to missed
opportunities for better achieving policy goals by centralizing some
functions but providing for the exercise of decentralized authority for
others. This is because the tradeoffs among competing values may differ
based on function. Centralizing authority to gather scientific or technical
information, for example, may provide significant economies of scale,
while the need to experiment and take advantage of local expertise may be
minimal.248 The case for centralizing the task of accumulating the data
needed for effective health care regulation, for instance, appears strong.249
In contrast, the diversity, expertise, democratic, and experimentation
benefits of decentralizing standard-setting and/or implementation
functions may be more important than the efficiencies that result from
having only one regulator perform those functions and any unfairness of
subjecting affected entities to multiple standards. As Abigail Moncrieff
and Eric Lee have argued with respect to health care regulation:

246

See, e.g., Michael Halberstam, The Myth of “Conquered Provinces”: Probing the
Extent of the VRA’s Encroachment on State and Local Autonomy, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 923,
945-46 (2011) (“Centralized decisionmakers cannot adequately replicate or anticipate the
experientially-based and contextual response of interested local actors who base their
judgments on their ‘particular circumstances of time and place.’”); ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW, THE ECONOMY, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 123, at 11 (arguing
for benefits of centralized environmental authority without regard to functional
differences); Dornbos, supra note 94, at 17 (discussing the benefits of decentralization
without mentioning functional differences).
247
See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES,
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 399-419 (2004) (discussing unification of national
security/intelligence operations, but not potential for making different judgments on
centralization based on governmental function).
248
See 6, supra note 6, at 623.
249
See, e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff & Eric Lee, The Positive Case for Centralization in
Health Care Regulation: The Federalism Failures of the ACA, 20-SPG KAN. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 266, 276 (2011).
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If the states choose different policy approaches to manage the costs of,
quality of, and access to healthcare, then regulators might learn which
approaches work and which do not. At a minimum, regulators would
learn more through the states’ various attempts than they ever could from
a single, uniform national policy.250

Thus, it may make sense to centralize some functions but not others.
Structuring agency authority without regard to differences based on the
particular governmental function may unnecessarily sacrifice important
values.
The enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 251 illustrates the benefits of drawing functional
distinctions in determining whether to create centralized or decentralized
authority. The Obama Administration opposed preemption of stricter state
regulatory protections,252 and the statute limits the authority of agencies
such as the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to preempt state regulation.253 Thus,
Dodd-Frank preserves decentralized standard-setting. According to the
General Accountability Office (GAO), however, Dodd-Frank’s delegation
of authority to the CFPB to assist in improving the financial literacy and
education of individual consumers of financial products, services, and
concepts meant that fourteen federal agencies are now responsible for
administering sixteen significant federal financial literacy programs or
activities.254 The GAO concedes the potential benefits of having multiple
federal agencies involved in financial literacy efforts, including the ability
to take advantage of “deep and long-standing expertise and experience
addressing a specific issue area.” 255 But the resulting multiplicity of
authority “increases the risk of inefficiency and duplication of efforts,”256
particularly in light of the substantial “similarities in mission between
CFPB’s statutory responsibilities and those of certain other federal
250

Id. at 276.
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
252
See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION 61(2009) (Obama Administration white paper proposing financial
regulatory reform). For further discussion of the background of the white paper, see
Todd J. Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?,
81GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2130942, at 5-6.
253
Edward F. Greene, The Limits of “Name-and-Shame” in International Financial
Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1083, 1094-95 (2012).
254
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OVERLAP OF PROGRAMS SUGGESTS
THERE MAY BE OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONSOLIDATION, GAO-12-588, at 9 (July 2012),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592849.pdf.
255
Id. at 14.
256
Id.
251
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entities.”257 The vesting in the CFPB of a significant role in enhancing
consumer financial protection was an opportunity to consolidate federal
financial literacy efforts in a more efficient and effective way. 258 The
GAO urged policymakers to consider consolidating authority over
financial literacy information to avoid overlap, duplication, and
inefficiency. 259 Whether the GAO’s assessment is ultimately convincing
or not, this example suggests that the pros and cons of centralization and
decentralization may differ by function, and that policymakers should
carefully consider the possibility of different organizational structures for
different functions.
2. Functional Jurisdiction and the Overlapping-Distinct Dimension
As with analyses of the appropriate scale of government, a focus on
functional jurisdiction makes clear that decisions on whether to provide
for jurisdictional overlap are not an all-or-nothing proposition. Simply
because two agencies share substantive jurisdiction does not mean that
they overlap if their functional jurisdictions are distinct. Unfortunately,
proponents and detractors of overlapping jurisdiction often ignore whether
agency jurisdictions overlap functionally, losing an opportunity to
accommodate some of the accountability benefits of overlap while
minimizing inefficiencies. Finally, policymakers may be able to better
achieve regulatory goals by designing governmental institutions to overlap
for some functions but not others.
Congress has sometimes chosen to define distinct realms of agency
functional authority, even though the agencies involved share substantive
jurisdictions. For example, Congress vested in one agency the authority to
adopt and in another the authority to enforce occupational safety
standards. 260 Similarly, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 261 vested
authority over the service aspects of immigration, including asylum and
naturalization, in the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,262 while
placing immigration enforcement duties in the hands of the U.S. Customs

257

Id. at 15, 19.
Id. at 20.
259
Id. at 20-21.
260
See George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions
from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 330 (1987); Freeman &
Rossi, supra note 4, at 1150.
261
Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 6
U.S.C.).
262
See http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis.
258
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and Border Protection. 263 Though both agencies have jurisdiction over
immigration, their authority is largely distinct because there is little
overlap in functional jurisdiction.
Yet in other cases, opportunities for promoting more efficient and
effective regulation through the creation of distinct functional divisions of
authority may have been missed. Detractors of overlap often focus on the
inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of duplicative regulation, concluding
that the solution should be agency consolidation.264 In 1939, for example,
President Franklin Roosevelt used authority derived from the
Reorganization Act of 1939 265 to combine half a dozen agencies
responsible for matters dealing with health care, economic security, and
education into a new subcabinet-level agency, the Federal Security
Agency (FSA). 266 Roosevelt justified the consolidation by highlighting
the efficiency that would result by combining agencies with shared
substantive jurisdiction over matters such as medical research, civil
defense, national security, social security, federal education assistance,
weapons development, and food and drug regulation.267
An institutional configuration characterized by shared substantive
authority but not functional overlap, however, might also have addressed
the same concerns. By eliminating duplication of functions, the regime
would help minimize administrative costs, the risk of over-regulation, and
the imposition of inconsistent mandates that created uncertainty and
unfairness. Retaining shared substantive authority, however, might also
preserve the accountability benefits from having multiple authorities
involved in the regulatory process—albeit in charge of distinct functions.
In this way, it is possible that Roosevelt could have achieved similar
efficiencies, and perhaps even more effective regulation, by retaining
shared substantive authority but minimizing overlap by allocating distinct
functional duties to each agency.
Relatedly, attention to functional jurisdiction allows policymakers to
focus on whether there are good reasons to decrease overlap for one
function but maintain or increase it for another. A few scholars, such as
Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi, have helpfully recognized that the
arguments in favor of creating overlapping or distinct authority may differ
263

See http://www.cbp.gov/; The Honorable Asa Hutchinson, Holes in the Fence:
Immigration Reform and Border Security in the United States, Keynote Address, 59
ADMIN. L. REV. 533, 537 (2007).
264
See supra notes 154 to 266 and accompanying text.
265
3 U.S.C. § 45a (1946).
266
See supra notes 9 to 21 and accompanying text.
267
Id. at 592.
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depending on the particular governmental function involved.268 Yet, when
most scholars or agencies make assertions promoting overlapping
jurisdiction, they appear to underappreciate the significance of
differentiating along this dimension based on agency function and give
short shrift to whether overlap is appropriate or effective for all
governmental functions.269 Proponents of overlapping jurisdiction usually
focus on the effectiveness and accountability benefits of redundant
institutions, especially for significant or irreplaceable resources or for
situations in which massive costs are anticipated if regulatory failure
occurs.270 Yet the assessment of whether these redundancy benefits are
worth the inefficiency costs may differ from function to function.
Policymakers might structure authority differently along the overlapdistinctness dimension because the relative value of efficiency and
redundancy differ based on the task at issue. Redundant development of
information on the health risks of pollutant exposures at different levels,
for example, may create waste without improving significantly the quality
of the output. 271 On the other hand, the efficiency gains of vesting
exclusive standard-setting or enforcement authority in one regulator may
not justify the loss of the safety net that results from having multiple
enforcement authorities to protect against ineffective or absent
enforcement by a single agency.272 In short, failure to consider whether
overlapping or distinct authority is preferable on a function-by-function
basis may result in the unnecessary sacrifice of effectiveness to achieve
efficient governance, or vice versa.

268

See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1146 (arguing that overlapping authority to
enforce the antitrust laws may create inefficiencies and disagreements over enforcement
policy); id. at 1147 (noting that two agencies set food safety standards, but that they bring
different kinds of expertise to the effort).
269
See, e.g., Aagaard, supra note 152, at 286-300 (addressing costs and benefits of
overlap, mostly without drawing clear distinctions based on function).
270
See, e.g., Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the
Potential for Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 745-46
(2010) (describing critical role of local governments in reducing greenhouse gas
emissions to “create redundancy to compensate for regulatory failures”).
271
Cf. Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941,
1048 (2000) (discussing the value of EPA’s technical expertise in adopting air quality
standards).
272
See Engel, supra note 7, at 179-80 (discussing “regulatory safety net” provided by
overlapping state and federal jurisdiction over pollution regulation and enforcement).
There may be a strong argument for distinct authority, however, if there is directly
conflicting authority by regulators (at whatever level of government) without a
discernible difference in subject-matter competence.
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3. Functional Jurisdiction and the Coordination-Independence
Dimension
A few scholars have addressed the need for agency coordination across
not only substantive but also functional domains, recognizing that it may
be advisable to require coordinated action for some governmental
functions but to allow independent agency action for others. 273 In
discussing the federal government’s approach to agricultural policy, for
example, David Weisbach and Jacob Nussim posit that the Internal
Revenue Service is well situated to control financing through investment
subsidies, while the Department of Agriculture is the best agency to
regulate farmers more generally through standard-setting and related
functions.274 They conclude that “separate agencies for each function, and
the resulting lack of coordination, could be optimal.”275
More frequently, however, those analyzing agency structure promote
either increased independence or coordination without fully appreciating
or even acknowledging the significance of functional jurisdiction. 276
Because the arguments for coordinated or independent authority are likely
to vary with the governmental function in question, this oversight creates
the risk that analysts will overlook opportunities to achieve the optimal
balance of policy goals by coordinating some functions but taking
advantage of the exercise of independent authority for others. For
instance, it may make sense to strike the balance between avoiding the
inefficiency or inconsistency (arising from uncoordinated action) and
avoiding groupthink (through independent agency authority) differently
for the financing or planning and standard-setting functions. Policymakers
should not elide these differences by confining their analysis solely to the
extent of coordination in substantive authority.
Two examples illuminate the potential value of situating disparate
agency functions at different points along the coordination-independence
dimension. The first involves requiring multiple intelligence agencies to
report to a single supervisor, the Director of National Intelligence. The
9/11 Commission and the Center for Strategic International Studies
expressed concerns that such coordination might suppress innovation and
competition among intelligence agencies, and that enhanced coordination
273

See, e.g., Arnold M. Howitt & Herman B. “Dutch” Leonard, Katrina and the Core
Challenges of Disaster Response, 30-WTR FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 215, 220 (2006).
274
Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 245, at 994-95.
275
Id. The authors note the need to recognize “that desirable separation of functions into
divisions is going to lead to lack of coordination.” Id.
276
See, e.g., DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 7, at 2221, 2232, 2253 (discussing forms of
agency coordination, but failing to differentiate between functional and substantive
coordination).
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is likely to discourage opposing views precisely when they are most
needed. 277 Others have pointed out, however, that the value of
competition may be outweighed by the risk that agencies taking
inconsistent approaches in acting on accumulated intelligence will operate
inefficiently, if not at cross-purposes, thwarting achievement of efforts to
thwart terrorist attacks.278 Yet these seemingly dueling arguments are not
necessarily irreconcilable; the detractors of coordination were focused
primarily on the gathering and analysis of intelligence information, while
proponents were focusing on governmental action in response. In these
circumstances, the arguments for allowing agencies to act independently
may be stronger for the information-analysis function than for the
implementation function, and effective regime design might seek to limit
coordination in the former but promote it in the latter.
The second example involves a comparison of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act
(ESA). NEPA requires each agency proposing a major federal action to
consult with and solicit the comments of other federal agencies with
jurisdiction or special expertise during the process of preparing
environmental impact statements on such proposed actions. 279 The
proposing agency must incorporate or respond to any comments in the
final EIS. 280 In addition, NEPA created an agency, the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) to supervise compliance by other agencies
with their NEPA evaluation and disclosure responsibilities, a task it has
undertaken through the issuance of binding regulations that govern NEPA
implementation by other agencies. 281
NEPA thus provides for
coordination across the federal government of information-gathering and
planning responsibilities282 concerning agency actions that may affect the
environment. NEPA does little, however, to require agencies to undertake
or coordinate monitoring of the actual environmental impacts of activities
for which impact statements have been prepared once implementation of
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O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1685.
See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1135 (arguing that although overlap allows
harnessing of specialized agencies’ expertise and competencies, “that potential can be
wasted if the agencies work at cross-purposes or fail to capitalize on one another’s unique
strengths and perspectives.”); Aaron J. Saiger, Obama’s “Czars” for Domestic Policy
and the Law of the White House Staff, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577, 2588 (2011) (noting
need for coordination to control illegal drugs because law enforcement and health care
agencies were ignorant of or hostile to each other’s approaches).
279
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
280
40 C.F.R. § 1503.4(a).
281
Id. § 1500.3.
282
See id. §§ 1501.1, 1501.2(a).
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those activities begins.283 NEPA would likely have been more effective at
actually minimizing the adverse environmental consequences of federal
agency activities if it had extended coordination obligations to monitoring
of the effects of project activities.
Some NEPA critics go one step further by disapproving the statute’s
absence of any substantive content. The Supreme Court has clearly ruled
that NEPA’s mandates are procedural in nature, not substantive.284 Critics
have urged that it be amended (or reinterpreted by the courts) to infuse
substantive content into its environmental protection mandates.285 Such a
change would prioritize environmental values in a way that NEPA does
not currently do. Short of that change, one way to increase the CEQ’s
coordinating role would be to vest in it authority to remand projects on the
basis of their adverse environmental effects, which would provide a
stronger form of agency coordination than NEPA now provides.
Although such a strengthening of NEPA’s coordination mechanisms is
unlikely to occur any time soon, the ESA provides a model for what that
form of coordination might look like. The ESA mandates federal
interagency coordination not only in information generation and planning,
but also in project implementation. Section 7 requires federal agencies to
avoid actions that will “jeopardize the continued existence” of listed
endangered or threatened species or “result in the destruction or
modification of” their critical habitat.286 It requires an agency to consult
with the National Marine Fisheries Service (for marine species) or Fish
and Wildlife Service (for freshwater and wildlife species) on any agency
action which is likely to jeopardize a listed species. 287 The formal
consultation process concludes when the Service issues a biological
opinion on whether the proposed activity is likely to jeopardize a listed
species or adversely modify critical habitat, suggesting reasonable and
prudent alternatives (RPAs) that would avoid such harms. The opinion
may also include an incidental take statement conditionally authorizing the
take of individual species members, provided the agency complies with
the specified RPAs. 288 According to the Supreme Court, the Service’s
283

The CEQ regulations provide only that “[a]gencies may provide for monitoring to
assure that their decisions are carried out and should do so in important cases.” 40 C.F.R.
§ 1505.3.
284
See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 558 (1978).
285
James T.B. Tripp, Streamlining NEPA’s Environmental Review Process: Suggestions
for Agency Reform, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 74, 76-77 (2003) (citing critiques to this
effect).
286
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
287
Id.
288
Id. § 1536(b)(3), (4); 50 C.F.R. §402.14.
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Biological Opinion has a powerful coercive effect.289 If the action agency
ignores the RPAs, it must articulate its reasons for disagreement. It runs a
substantial risk if those reasons turn out to be wrong,290 placing it at risk of
violating the statutory prohibition on the taking of listed species,291 while
an agency that complies with the terms of an incidental take statement is
shielded from a finding that it has violated that prohibition.292
Though both NEPA and the ESA require inter-agency coordination,
the ESA’s coordination mandates extend beyond information-gathering
and planning to project implementation, illustrating that it is possible to
require coordination for some functions but not others. Policymakers
should consider the benefits and disadvantages of coordination and
independence on a function-by-function basis. They may conclude that
coordination of one function will provide efficiency and policy
effectiveness gains that justify the administrative costs of coordination and
the risk of groupthink that stifles innovation. For a different function,
however, the balance may point in a different direction.
B. The Importance of Appreciating the Dimensions of Authority
The literature on how to apportion substantive authority is much more
extensive than the literature on functional authority.293 Nevertheless, this
literature is incomplete for two reasons. First, scholars and policymakers
often fail to consider how authority should be allocated along each of the
dimensions described in Part III. Second, even when they do consider
multiple dimensions of authority, they sometimes conflate the advantages
and disadvantages of locating authority along two or more of the
dimensions. Regardless of the particular dimensions that are being
neglected or conflated, the bottom line is the same – incomplete vetting of
the organizational choices and lost opportunities to foster primary goals or
achieve complementary objectives. Separating out the dimensions as we
suggest will preserve as many policy options as possible among competing
organizational structures. Where to situate a particular program along
each dimension should reflect consideration of the values promoted by
each dimensional choice and prioritization of any conflicting values.

289

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997).
Id.
291
Id. at 170. The taking prohibition is codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2006).
292
16 U.S.C. § 1536(o)(2).
293
The literature on the federalism aspects of government programs is particularly
extensive. See Alessandra Arcuri & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Centralization and
Decentralization as a Risk-Return Trade-off, 53 J. L. & ECON. 359, 361 (2010); supra
note 6.
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The three dimensions should not be viewed in isolation; in all but one
situation, they are iterative. If policymakers with authority to contemplate
the creation of a new government program or the reorganization of an
existing one choose to vest all authority to administer the program in a
single centralized governmental entity, they need not consider either of the
other two dimensions.294 As Figure 6 below demonstrates, however, if the
desired program is decentralized (either among governmental levels or
within a level), then more than one agency will necessarily have authority
(unless the geographic boundaries of each regulator’s jurisdiction are
mutually exclusive). 295 If more than one governmental entity has
jurisdiction, policymakers have meaningful institutional design options
beyond simply choosing a decentralized structure. The remaining options
involve whether to vest the two or more agencies that will have
jurisdiction with distinct or overlapping authority, and whether to allow or
require those agencies to act independently of one another or to allow or
require coordinated action.

294

Even in this circumstance, the single institution may exercise substantive authority
that is at least peripherally within the realm of other entities’ substantive powers, both
within and outside the jurisdiction, and there may be value in considering coordination
with these other entities. In addition, agencies are not monolithic entities, and different
divisions or offices within a single agency may provide choices along the overlap and
coordination dimensions.
295
Both New York City and Los Angeles have the authority to adopt land use controls
such as zoning laws. In most respects, this Article is not concerned with the relationship
between the authority of those two regulators. They do not have overlapping jurisdiction,
as this Article uses that term, even though both are authorized to regulate land use,
because no landowner is subject to the jurisdiction of both agencies. The structuring of
agency authority to allow geographically distinct regulators to act is relevant to the
centralization-decentralization dimension, however, to the extent that decentralization is
justified by the desire to promote experimentation and innovation by multiple regulators.
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Figure 6. Dimension Relationships

The interactions among the dimensions are important because they
may act synergistically or at cross-purposes with one another. Although
the dividing lines among the dimensions will in some instances blur at the
margins, 296 we suggest that the values promoted by the poles of each
dimension are sufficiently different from one another that there is value in
considering each choice sequentially.
Thus, for example, suppose that policymakers have chosen to create a
program of both federal and state authority in order to achieve the
diversity, experimentation, and accountability benefits of a decentralized
regime. They should next consider whether they prefer that overlapping
authority among federal and state regulators (to provide redundancy and a
safety net against inactivity or capture by regulators at one level), or
instead prefer to promote the efficiencies resulting from the creation of
distinct regulatory responsibilities. 297 Finally, policymakers should
consider whether they place a higher priority on achieving the efficiencies
of coordinated regulation among multiple regulators and on minimizing
the risk of agencies working at cross-purposes, or the effectiveness
296

Efforts to reduce overlap may bleed over into centralization, for example. See supra
note 160 and accompanying text.
297
See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 3, at 17 (urging that issues concerning overlap be
considered in terms of the optimal level of agency and regulatory redundancy/overlap – a
framing which necessarily requires balancing the costs and benefits of such strategies
compared to the alternatives).
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advantages that stem from allowing regulators to act independently so as
to avoid groupthink that may stifle the experimentation benefits provided
by decentralized government.
The discussion below elaborates on the importance of the dimensions
of authority, both individually and in relation to one another. It illustrates
how regulatory programs may be adversely affected by neglect or
conflation of the consequences of moving along each of the dimensions.
1. Conflation of the Overlap/Distinct and Decentralized/Centralized
Dimensions
As Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi have pointed out, “[i]nstances of
overlap and fragmentation are not rare or isolated. They can be found
throughout the administrative state, in virtually every sphere of social and
economic regulation, in contexts ranging from border security to food
safety to financial regulation.” 298 A growing literature promotes
overlapping jurisdiction based on its capacity to provide diversity,
experimentation, and expertise benefits, but some scholars appear to
commingle the advantages of overlap with those of decentralized
authority.299 For example, some have promoted overlapping jurisdiction
based on its capacity to take advantage of the exercise of authority that is
tailored to particular regulatory circumstances or to benefit from unique
Such arguments conflate overlap with
agency expertise. 300
decentralization because the benefits of accommodating diversity of
circumstances or taking advantage of agency expertise are more
appropriately attributed to decentralized governance.301 Put another way,
it is the feature of decentralization that allows for localized tailoring of
regulation and the application of an array of expertise, not the fact that the
authority is overlapping.
Likewise, some proponents of overlapping jurisdiction argue that a key
benefit is that it allows significant experimentation opportunities. One
scholar, for example, in discussing the benefits of redundancy, posits that
“[d]iffering perspectives allow agencies to function more like laboratories,

298

Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1134.
See, e.g., O'
Connell, supra note 1, at 1659 (equating redundancy and decentralization);
id. at 1673 n.104 (same, but recognizing that differences may exist).
300
See, e.g., Doran, supra note 173, at 1820-21 (stating that information theory “implies
that the institutional determinants of redundancy usually facilitate specialization”); id. at
1849 (discussing theory that Congress enacts redundant programs to pursue informational
efficiency).
301
For a description of the expertise and diversity benefits of decentralization, see supra
notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
299
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by devising new solutions to new problems.” 302 Another claims that
redundancy “enables a range of experts with diverse viewpoints to
contribute to the lawmaking process and it fosters competition and rivalry
among decisionmakers, leading to a level of innovation and creativity that
is impossible to achieve with a single decisionmaking body.” 303 Still
others have asserted that overlapping authorities “are more likely to
discover which instruments most effectively respond” to a particular
problem.304
These arguments largely also conflate decentralized with overlapping
authority. 305 The opportunity to learn from the experiences of other
jurisdictions that have adopted different regulatory strategies is more
appropriately regarded as a benefit of decentralized governance. 306 If
policymakers adopt a redundant governmental structure in order to
achieve the diversity or experimentation benefits of having multiple
regulators, they may fail to appreciate that though decentralization
promotes those ends, a decentralized regime can be structured with either
overlapping or distinct authority. The choices along that dimension call
for analysis of the tradeoff between the efficiency advantages of a system
of distinct authority and the protections against capture and agency
inaction307 provided by overlapping authority.
Conflation of these two dimensions sometimes also occurs in the
opposite direction. Scholars have attributed to decentralization of
authority the benefits of creating a regulatory safety net that protects
against the risk of capture and agency inaction.308 Decentralized authority
may not create such a safety net, however, if each agency is assigned a
discrete substantive jurisdiction. It is the overlap and coordination of
302

Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today'
s Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2325 (2006).
303
Nancy Staudt, Redundant Tax and Spending Programs, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1197,
1200 (2006).
304
Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 7, at 107.
305
In rare circumstances when experimentation must occur quickly, such as when the
problem to be addressed by government is expected to be ephemeral and/or infrequent,
overlap arguably may be a way to spur innovation. In such cases, simultaneous activity
by agencies with overlapping jurisdiction may be best suited to generating the lessons
provided by experimentation.
306
See Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent
Capital in Corporate Governance, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 281, 317
(2012) (“[E]xperimentation is probably most effective when several different approaches
can be tried simultaneously in different jurisdictions.”); Esty, Environmental Federalism,
supra note 6, at 606 (“A decentralized regulatory strategy permits the simultaneous
testing of various policy responses.”)
307
See Katyal, supra note 302, at 2324 (discussing the risks of relying on one agency
because “[w]hen one bulb blows, everything goes.’”).
308
See, e.g., Aagaard, supra note 152, at 294-95.
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jurisdiction among multiple agencies that may protect against capture and
inaction, not decentralization.309
Although overlap provides redundancy benefits, it also creates the
potential for duplicative regulation that wastes agency resources,
regulation that creates conflicting or onerous obligations for regulated
entities, or inadequate regulation by agencies seeking to rely on (or blame)
the efforts of peer agencies. 310 A common response to the incentives
toward either over-regulation or under-regulation caused by overlapping
governance is to call for the consolidation of regulatory authority. 311
Proponents of centralized authority argue that consolidation within a
governmental level minimizes pursuit of divergent goals or inconsistent
actions by multiple agencies that may interfere with agency missions.
However, consolidation is not the only way to address inappropriate levels
or methods of regulation. Instead, policymakers can retain the same
number of agencies and delegate distinct tasks to each. Conflation of the
overlap-distinctness and decentralization-centralization dimensions masks
this option.
The reorganization of federal agencies to establish the Department of
Homeland Security is illustrative. Congress created the DHS in 2002 out
of more fragmented federal authorities in part to reduce the potential for
the numerous existing intelligence-gathering agencies to work at crosspurposes. 312 Some have questioned whether the pre-2002 landscape
actually was characterized by excessive overlap of agency authority. 313
Even if it was, however, it is not clear that consolidation effectively
reduced inter-agency interference. Professors Freeman and Rossi charge
that the 2002 Act failed to eliminate overlapping and potentially
conflicting functions in the new DHS.314

309

See supra notes 182 to 185 and accompanying text. The degree to which overlap
counters capture may depend on whether one of the agencies with overlapping
jurisdiction has the authority to veto actions by others or whether each agency has the
authority to proceed without the consent of the others. If, for example, a regulated entity
wants to squelch regulatory action, it will be easier for it to achieve its goal by capturing
an agency with veto power than multiple agencies, each of which have the authority to
regulate on its own.
310
See supra notes 154 to 166 and accompanying text. See also Aagaard, supra note 152,
at 287-88; Marisam, supra note 20, at 198.
311
See supra notes 170, 294 and accompanying text.
312
See Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 683-84.
313
See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Outsourcing Is Not Our Only Problem, 76 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1216, 1224 (2008).
314
Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1153-54.
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In such cases, policymakers may be well advised to consider
delineating more distinct lines of substantive authority or allocating
distinct functional authority to different agencies with jurisdiction over the
same subject matter instead of centralizing authority through a reduction
in the number of agencies.315
2. Conflation of the Coordination/Independence and
Decentralized/Centralized Dimensions
It is tempting to consider substantial levels of coordination to be akin
to centralized authority. However, even at its most robust, coordination is
a different characteristic of governance than centralization. 316 The
benefits of centralization tend to be the opportunity to achieve economies
of scale, the ability to address collective action problems (such as interjurisdictional spillovers) more effectively that decentralized approaches
can, and the achievement of fairness through uniformity and weakening of
the power of factions.317 Coordination primarily promotes cost-effective
government and reduces the risk that the acts of one authority will
counteract or frustrate those of another. 318 Though centralization may
help decrease the costs of coordination, they seek fundamentally different
goals.
Yet, many policymakers and scholars have touted coordinated
government as a way to take advantage of economies of scale. 319 As
Jacob Gersen has noted, the centralized regulatory review literature “often
equates coordination with centralized control, even though centralization
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for coordination. Strong
vertical control over subordinates may facilitate coordination, but there
seems to be no shortage of lackadaisical supervisors in the world.” 320
315

According to several observers, the folding of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency into the DHS deemphasized emergency management, hampering the response to
Hurricane Katrina. Elizabeth F. Kent, Note, “Where'
s the Cavalry?” Federal Response
to 21st Century Disasters, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 181, 206 (2006); Cohen et al., supra
note 1, at 740. Increased centralization may have subordinated emergency management
to the DHS’s priority concern, prevention of terrorism. Reduction of overlap by
assigning different functions to agencies responsible for information gathering and
planning, and emergency response implementation, may have minimized inter-agency
interference while continuing to benefit from agency experience and expertise.
316
See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 3, at 40 (arguing that “the coordination of
functions and responsibilities will not happen merely because previously separate bureaus
are combined into a single department”).
317
See supra notes 115 to 136 and accompanying text.
318
See supra notes 204 to 207 and accompanying text.
319
Symposium Transcripts, Sustainable Energy Development in Emerging Markets, 24 U.
PA. J. INT'
L ECON. L. 759, 792 (2003) (remarks of Steven Richards) (concerning energy
access).
320
Jacob E. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 VA. L. REV. 301, 346 (2010).

To be published in Volume 51 of the HARVARD JOURNAL ON LEGISLATION

62

FUNCTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN 3-D

[30-Mar-13

Likewise, extensive inter-jurisdictional coordination can certainly occur in
a largely decentralized regime.321
Though some may fail to differentiate coordination from
centralization, others actually have conflated coordinated and
decentralized authority. Some scholars have advocated coordination as a
way to garner the benefits of multiple perspectives, specialized
knowledge, and opportunities for agencies to test new ideas. 322 To be
sure, some coordination of information between authorities must occur for
these benefits to accrue. However, because these diversity and expertise
benefits more fundamentally rely on the existence of various authorities,
we assert that these are primarily attributes of decentralization.
Still other scholars conflate decentralization with independence.
These commenters have asserted that a key attribute of decentralized
governance is that it provides a way for governmental authorities to
compete with each other and thus promote efficiency and effectiveness.
According to one source, for example, “economic insights, such as the
heterogeneity of preferences and the efficiency of the competitive process
for government regulation, may lead to the conclusion that
decentralization guarantees efficiency gains.” 323 However, while some
level of decentralization of governmental authority undoubtedly must exist
for there to be inter-jurisdictional competition, it is not decentralization,
but rather the independence of multiple agencies with jurisdiction over a
problem, that provides the primary foundation for competition. For
example, lodging considerable governmental jurisdiction in only two or
three national agencies might create a fairly centralized regulatory regime;
yet such governmental authorities could be designed to be highly
competitive. 324 Likewise, a fundamentally decentralized allocation of
governmental authority might nonetheless involve considerable
cooperation and collaboration between governmental authorities, hardly
the hallmark of inter-jurisdictional competition.325
321

See COUNCIL OF GREAT LAKES GOVERNORS, THE GREAT LAKES CHARTER:
PRINCIPLES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF GREAT LAKES WATER RESOURCES (1985); supra
note 222 and accompanying text (discussing coordination through interstate compacts).
322
See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1210.
323
Aurélian Portuese, The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Principle of Economic Efficiency,
17 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 231, 239 (2011). See also Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism,
Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 310
(2012) (questioning assumption that decentralized decision making and interjurisdictional
competition will foster fiscal responsibility and efficiency).
324
Cf. O’Connell, supra note 1 (advocating an almost exclusively federal but competitive
governmental regime for national security intelligence gathering).
325
See, e.g., Blake Hudson, Fail-Safe Federalism and Climate Change: The Case of U.S.
and Canadian Forest Policy, 44 CONN. L. REV. 925, 936 (2012) (arguing for
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By
conflating
the
coordination/independence
and
centralization/decentralization dimensions, scholars and policymakers lose
an opportunity to better tailor the design of governmental authority. If a
policymaker’s goal is to achieve economies of scale or uniform and
equitable regulatory treatment, then centralization is often the best way to
do so. If, however, a policymaker decides to create a decentralized regime
to take advantage of the democracy, diversity, expertise, and
experimentation benefits that such a structure is apt to provide, the
policymaker should further consider whether decentralized power should
be accompanied by coordination or independence among the multiple
agencies authorized to address the problem in question. That choice
involves a tradeoff between the advantages of a fair and cost-efficient
structure that minimizes the risk of conflicting policy approaches326 with a
structure that avoids the administrative costs of coordinated action and
fosters competition, while protecting against groupthink. Conflation of
the centralization/decentralization and coordination/independence
dimensions may mask the important tradeoffs involved in situating a
regime along the latter dimension.
One example of a reorganization effort that may have failed to
appreciate the option of moving along the coordination-independence
dimension instead of the centralization-decentralization dimension is the
reorganization of agency power over consumer financial products and
services that resulted from enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.327
Dodd-Frank delegated to the newly created CFPB the combined authority
of seven federal agencies previously responsible for protecting consumers
of financial services. 328 Part of the impetus for that consolidation was
dissatisfaction with the competition between the OTS and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) for new charters by banks and thrift
institutions. By lowering their standards, the OTS and the OCC competed
for the ability to issue charters to banks and thrift institutions, which had
the option of choosing to subject themselves to either regulator.329 As two
decentralized but coordinated forest policy-making process); Garrick B. Pursley &
Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 935 (2011) (supporting
decentralized but cooperative regime for renewable energy development).
326
See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1182 (discussing potential for conflicting
interpretations of legal requirements and incompatible compliance requirements absent
coordination).
327
See supra notes 60 to 61, 251 to 259 and accompanying text (discussing the DoddFrank Act).
328
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Financial Services Industry’s Misguided Quest to
Undermine the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 REV. OF BANKING &
FINANCIAL L. 881, 882 (2012).
329
Dain C. Donelson & David Zaring, Requiem for a Regulator: the Office of Thrift
Supervision'
s Performance During the Financial Crisis, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1777, 1781
(2011).
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scholars explained, “[t]he combination of fee dependence on the part of
the regulators and the ability of regulated institutions to credibly threaten
to switch charters is thought by detractors to create a capture-ready
environment, in which agencies become beholden to the industries that
underwrite their budgets.”330 The existence of multiple agencies charged
with regulating consumer financial transactions created a diffusion of
responsibility and lax enforcement. 331 Dodd-Frank consolidated in the
CFPB federal regulatory functions (including research, information
distribution, and standard-setting) over banks and thrifts as a way to
eliminate inter-agency competition that reduced the effectiveness of
regulation.332
Greater centralization of regulatory power was not the only way to
reduce destructive competition, however. Indeed, the antidote for
excessive competition is perhaps more logically found by moving toward
the coordination end of the independence-coordination dimension.
According to some assessments, congressional efforts through
consolidation to streamline and eliminate destructive inter-agency
competition did not fully succeed, as “Congress did not substantially
reduce or consolidate existing federal regulators, as some had proposed,”
and “information sharing and coordination remain significant challenges
to the effective operation of the fragmented regime.”333 As these scholars
recognized, Congress may have been better advised to require
information-sharing and other forms of coordination of the activities of
multiple bank and thrift regulators instead of consolidating authority in the
hands of the CFPB. 334 At the very least, a move toward greater
coordination (without centralization) should have been on the table as an
option worth considering. Allowing multiple agencies to retain authority
but requiring them to coordinate might have reduced destructive (and
unfair) inter-agency competition, while taking advantage of the expertise
and experimentation benefits that decentralized governance may supply.
A similar story may be told about the adoption of the Homeland
Security Act in response to the events of 9/11, which is also discussed
above in connection with conflation of the overlap/distinctness and
330

Id. at 1785, 1787, 1788.
That configuration also may have contributed to unequal and unfair treatment of
participants in those transactions at the hands of different regulators.
332
ADAM J. LEVITIN, THE PEW ECONOMIC GROUP: THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION AGENCY 7 (2009).
333
Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1148.
334
Id. at 1154. See also Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 3, at 48-49 (noting that consumer
financial protection regulatory reform could have taken different paths, including creation
of a new agency, centralization of power in an existing agency, or creation of a system
for closer coordination of effort by existing agencies).
331
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centralization/decentralization dimensions. 335 Congress consolidated the
authority of many federal agencies in the new DHS in part to reduce
competition among agencies performing intelligence functions that was
perceived as being counterproductive. 336 Some critics have taken issue
with the objective of eliminating competition, which they believe had
yielded helpful policy innovations.337 Even if reduced competition was
desirable, however, others have concluded that the creation of the DHS
failed to increase the efficiency of intelligence-gathering functions338 and
that coordination across agencies was in some instances better than within
the sprawling new Department. 339 They claim that it may have been
possible to accomplish the efficiency and effectiveness gains sought with
the creation of the DHS through the creation of a much smaller White
House-based agency that facilitated coordination at a fraction of the
administrative costs entailed in the shifting of responsibilities from other
agencies to the DHS. 340 A decision to increase coordination without
centralizing authority previously exercised by many agencies within a
single new Department also may have preserved the expertise built up by
the agencies folded into the DHS.341
3. Conflation of the Coordination/Independence and Overlap/Distinct
Dimensions
Another source of potential confusion is the conflation of coordination
and overlap. A discussion of wildfire management policy along the
wildland-urban interface, for example, describes the governing regime as
having shifted from one dominated by the U.S. Forest Service to one in
which state and local governments now play a significant role. In
describing the benefits of this “overlapping authority regime,” the author
refers to the strengthening of state and local firefighting resources through
335

See supra notes 312 to 315 and accompanying text.
Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 718.
337
Id. at 752.
338
Id. at 751-52.
339
Had Congress paid more attention to functional rather than substantive jurisdiction, it
might have chosen to coordinate among agencies with authority to protect national
security for certain functions but not others. It might have decided, for example, not to
coordinate information-gathering to preserve the independence of agencies and promote
innovative competition among them. It may also have decided, however, to require
coordinated implementation of national security plans and programs to prevent agencies
from working at cross-purposes.
340
Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 712, 753.
341
According to one observer, congressional neglect of expertise developed by agencies
before the creation of DHS “threatens those aspects of the other agencies’ missions that
overlap with new homeland security agenda. Jon Kalmuss-Katz, Eco Anti-terrorism:
EPA’s Role in Securing Our Nation'
s Chemical Plants, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 689, 733
(2011).
336
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increased funding, investment in the dissemination of best practices and
standards, resource sharing, and, generally, the strengthening of
interagency ties. 342 However, resource and information sharing and the
strengthening of interagency ties are more accurately attributed to a
coordinated regime, not necessarily an overlapping one. Multiple
agencies with overlapping authority could work completely in ignorance
of what agencies with shared authority are doing, or even at crosspurposes. Likewise, governmental authorities with little overlap in
jurisdiction (such as peer agencies from different states) can and often do
coordinate and learn from common experiences in their exercise of
authority.343
Similarly, some have conflated the opposite ends of these two
dimensions—that is, distinct and independent authority. Professor
O’Connell, for example, has asserted that distinct authorities can avoid the
groupthink to which redundant authority is prone.344 Groupthink is more
appropriately regarded, however, as the byproduct of highly coordinated
authority, and can be avoided by allowing and encouraging agencies to act
independently (whether or not their respective jurisdictions overlap).
Other scholars have identified a tradeoff between specialization and
coordination. 345 We regard these as two separate choices – overlap or
distinctness (a form of specialization), and coordination or independence.
The first pair deals largely with a tradeoff between effectiveness through
the creation of redundant authorities and efficiency through the
elimination of duplication of functions. The latter, however, largely
entails choosing between the effectiveness that results from reduced
opportunities for agencies working at cross-purposes with one another,
balanced against the reduced administrative costs resulting from avoidance
of the need to coordinate and the enhanced effectiveness from averting
groupthink. The two dimensions both involve efficiency-effectiveness
considerations, but they differ from one another.
The principal problem with conflating the overlap/distinctness and
coordination/independence dimensions is again the risk of missed
opportunities or thwarted goals. A policymaker may choose to require
coordination among multiple regulators as a means of achieving costeffectiveness and reducing opportunities for conflicting approaches. 346
342

Lauren Wishnie, Fire and Federalism, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1006 (2008).
See, e.g., Freeman and Rossi, supra note 4, at 1156 n.105 (discussing “Brown Bag
Lunch Group” involving information exchange among officials from across the
government, to “develop common approaches to shared problems.”).
344
O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1676.
345
See, e.g., Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 245, at 992.
346
See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
343
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Unless the policymaker also considers whether the coordinating agencies
should have overlapping or distinct authority, however, it may never
address whether it is better to supplement those goals with a structure that
creates redundancy as a means of creating a safety net against inaction, or
instead with a structure that is designed to achieve the administrative
efficiencies resulting from the creation of a distinct set of substantive
authorities.347 Likewise, a policymaker initially may choose overlapping
authority to create a safeguard against regulatory failure. It should also
consider, however, whether it prefers a coordinated approach that
minimizes opportunities for working at cross-purposes or one that stresses
the need to combat groupthink.
A recent example of coordination of overlapping authority is the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 348 which
requires the President to facilitate the sharing of information relating to
terrorism among federal, state, and local entities. In 2008, the Director of
National Intelligence published a strategy declaring “the imperative need
of moving beyond considering State and local government to be only ‘first
responders,’ preferring instead to thinking [sic] of them as the first line of
defense in a very deep line of information assets.” 349 The federal
government, through the DHS, has since financed state-operated “fusion
centers” to promote communication and coordination in the information
gathering function among regional, state, and local authorities on
intelligence matters.350
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2011351 also sheds light on the relationship
between the overlap/distinctness and coordination/independence
dimensions. A consensus developed that national security officials needed
to share information to help them “connect the dots” that would allow the
government to prevent future attacks.352 Notably, however, coordination
did not necessarily mean the elimination of redundancy, which represents
a different dimension in our typology. Professor Nathan Sales explained
that coupling coordination with redundancy facilitates information
sharing, resulting in competitive analysis among intelligence agencies
consulting a common pool of information, exposing policy makers to
diverse perspectives, and counteracting “groupthink tendencies.”353
347

See supra notes 154 to 156, 182 to 185 and accompanying text.
6 U.S.C. § 485 (2006).
349
Waxman, supra note 243, at 304-05.
350
Id. at 308-09.
351
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
352
Nathan Alexander Sales, Mending Walls: Information Sharing after the USA Patriot
Act, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1795, 1796 (2010).
353
Id. at 1801-02.
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Though we concur that reliance on redundant authority is not
inconsistent with coordination, we would characterize the structure created
by the USA PATRIOT Act somewhat differently. We regard competition
as a by-product of independence, not redundancy (or overlap). The Act
actually seems to have required coordination among national security with
respect to one function—information distribution or sharing—to promote
efficiency and avoid waste. At the same time, it encouraged competition
through independent performance of a different function—information
analysis—so as to garner to the benefits of competition and to avoid
groupthink.354
In
short,
by
conflating
the
overlap/distinctness
and
coordination/independence dimensions, policymakers risk creating
institutions unable to act in ways most likely to achieve regulatory goals.
By requiring coordination of overlapping authority, for example,
policymakers’ may forfeit the opportunity to reap the benefits of
competition that might have resulted from encouraging overlapping
regulators to exercise independent authority in carrying out a function
such as information analysis.
CONCLUSION
Decisions on how to allocate governmental authority are critical to the
fate of regulatory programs. Unfortunately, scholars and policymakers
routinely ignore how the nature of the governmental functions discussed in
Part II may affect assessments of the comparative merits of allocating
authority along the dimensions of governmental authority we distinguish
in Part III.. They also regularly conflate these dimensions. As Part IV
demonstrates, failure to consider functional jurisdiction or discriminate
among the different dimensions of authority risks frustrating efforts to
promote public goals or unnecessarily sacrificing complementary values.
The appropriate balance among competing goals or values inevitably
must be struck contextually.355 Nevertheless, it may be useful to provide
some tentative generalizations on how the relative merits of dimensional
allocations of authority are likely to differ by function. Additionally, a
consideration of how functional jurisdiction may generally interface with
the various dimensions of authority suggests novel opportunities to
maximize the advantages of a particular dimensional allocation while
minimizing its risks. In this conclusion, we begin by providing a few
preliminary observations regarding likely general tendencies in the
allocation of authority.
354
355

See O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1690 (urging such functional allocation).
See, e.g., Aagaard, supra note 152, at 280.
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Coordinating or Centralizing Research, Information Dissemination,
and Financing. In general, arguments for centralization and coordination
are likely to be stronger for scientific research, information organization
and distribution, and financing than for other governmental functions.
Centralization may frequently be a way to overcome collective action
problems, such as the incentives for each governmental entity to free ride
on the efforts of others, assuming information accumulated by one agency
will be shared with others. 356
In addition, centralization (or
357
coordination)
can produce administrative efficiencies by reducing
duplication of effort. On the other hand, the experimentation and diversity
benefits of decentralizing scientific research and particularly the collating
and distribution of information are likely to be more muted.
One factor in determining whether to centralize on the one hand or
decentralize and coordinate on the other might be the likelihood of
innovation by multiple governmental authorities. The more valuable
innovations are likely to be, the less advantages centralization is likely to
offer. The analysis of accumulated information, for example, may benefit
from the experimentation and expertise benefits of decentralization, as
multiple agencies may interpret the same data in different ways or devise
different strategies for acting on that data, reducing the risk of groupthink
that prevents innovative action that may promote values such as
effectiveness. 358 Assuming some level of decentralization, the choice
between overlapping or distinct authority might often be made by
comparing the efficiency gains of distinct authority with the redundancy
advantages of overlap.
The value of centralizing the scientific research and information
dissemination functions has been recognized in a variety of regulatory
contexts. In the environmental area, as Daniel Esty has explained,
delegating these functions to state and local regulators will tend to weaken
technical capacity and forfeit economies of scale, particularly because the
nature of many scientific and technical questions will be the same
regardless of jurisdiction.359 In the field of national security, the costs of
harmonizing state and local data collection efforts may be high, and trust
in the accuracy of shared information may be greater if it is accumulated

356

See, e.g., Eric T. Laity, The Corporation as Administrative Agency: Tax Expenditures
and Institutional Design, 28 VA. TAX REV. 411, 455 (2008).
357
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centrally. 360 Similarly, because “healthcare regulation . . . has become
increasingly objectivist and data-driven . . . , the greatest need is not for
voice or diversity . . . but rather for scale to gather reliable data.”361 In
addition, the federal government may have incentives to accumulate health
care data that lower levels of government lack, creating collective action
problems in a decentralized information-gathering regime.362
As with scientific research and information distribution, collective
action problems generally appear to provide a strong justification for
centralizing the financing function for many substantive jurisdictional
areas. States and localities will often lack incentives to invest in
intelligence and national security functions, for example, because the risks
of inadequate surveillance may be externalized if terrorist activity is
conducted in locations different from where they are planned, and some
jurisdictions may regard themselves as at low risk. In addition, the
political flack of ineffective counterterrorism measures tends to be borne
by the federal government.363 Finally, the federal government generally
will have superior capacity to finance regulatory programs.364
Of course, the appropriate allocation of authority is likely to differ for
other types of information gathering. In contrast to scientific research,
information distribution, and financing, the arguments for decentralization
are likely to be stronger for various monitoring activities, particularly of
localized conditions in fields of regulation such as environmental
protection. Knowledge of local pollution sources and conditions will
often provide a stronger justification for decentralized monitoring of
current levels of pollution, for example, than exists for the accumulation
and analysis of information on matters such as the degree of exposure to a
particular pollutant that creates unacceptable levels of health risk. 365
Similarly, there frequently may be advantages to vesting in lower levels of
government the task of determining the effect of regulated activity such as
pollution on local populations, especially local concentrations of
vulnerable or disadvantaged groups. Even in these circumstances,
360
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however, sound reasons likely remain for coordinating information
distribution systems among governmental authorities, or even centralizing
the distribution function in a dedicated authority. Again, context matters
in getting the functional allocation right.
Decentralizing and Coordinating Distinct Planning Authority. The
case for decentralized but coordinated planning generally seems stronger
than for other governmental functions. Superior knowledge of locationspecific needs and conditions may often support delegating planning
responsibilities to regional or local branches of federal agencies366 or to
lower levels of government. 367 In addition, the experimentation and
learning benefits of planning by many agencies would frequently support
decentralization. Conversely, economies of scale are likely to be more
difficult to achieve when planners must consider localized conditions in
detail and the issues are not entirely or even largely national in character,
reducing the value of centralization.
Assuming some level of decentralized planning authority is deemed
appropriate, policymakers also must consider how to situate that authority
along the overlap and coordination axes. Because overlapping planning
jurisdiction creates the potential for inconsistent mandates, planning
would appear to often be a good candidate for establishing an allocation of
substantively distinct authority. Regardless of whether authority is
overlapping or distinct, coordinated planning requirements may be
essential to avoid disastrous results like those experienced in the responses
to Hurricane Katrina. 368 If, for example, the federal government is
responsible for providing food and water to populations affected by
national disasters, they would need to know where local authorities are
planning to move at-risk populations. 369 As compared to the value of
harmonization, the value of competition among agencies may be relatively
small at the planning stage. The risk of holdouts, one of the anti-commons
problems associated with excessive coordination,370 might be minimized
in some circumstances by authorizing the federal government to take over
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the planning function if a state or locality fails to bear its fair share of the
planning burden.371
Decentralizing Independent Implementation and Enforcement.
Though increased inter-jurisdictional coordination may often make more
sense for functions such as ambient monitoring, financing, and planning,
maintenance of regulator independence for implementation and
enforcement may more frequently be beneficial.
Arguments for
decentralizing implementation and enforcement of regulatory programs
will likely be even more persuasive than for the planning function.
Decentralized authority allows for a range of management strategies in
implementation, which should facilitate the development of specialized
approaches tailored to local variations and circumstances. Furthermore,
maintaining decentralized implementation and enforcement should
continue to provide opportunities for regulatory experimentation.
Diversity and experimentation benefits have often been cited as
justifications for decentralizing implementation and enforcement activities
in diverse regulatory areas such as environmental,372 energy,373 and health
care policy.374 Additionally, collective action problems may be less likely
to arise from decentralized implementation and enforcement than for other
functions, particularly when information gathering, financing and standard
setting are centralized and/or coordinated.375
Reducing Functional Overlap in Conjunction with Stronger
Coordination. Though we largely agree with the literature asserting that
overlapping substantive jurisdiction provides a number of benefits, 376
instituting redundant governmental authority for every function is unlikely
to be valuable except in rare circumstances. Although shared regulatory
authority coalesced around particular substantive areas may often make
sense, in many circumstances such jurisdictional redundancy may better
be strategically focused on certain governmental functions (such as
371
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implementation and enforcement) than characterized by perfunctory
duplication when there are few likely redundancy benefits (such as in
information dissemination). Thus, it often may be valuable to reduce
overlap in functional jurisdiction even as shared substantive jurisdiction is
maintained or increased.
Such reductions in functional overlap may often be usefully
accompanied by the establishment of formal, strong coordination
mechanisms among the agencies sharing substantive authority. That
configuration would help ensure that functionally distinct authorities are
administered more efficiently and effectively.
Such a combined
reorganization strategy may reduce the inefficiencies commonly
associated with overlap, while maintaining some of the effectiveness and
accountability benefits available through the coordination of shared
substantive governance.
Whether these allocational configurations generally represent the
optimal balance of competing values should be tested by further analysis
and experimentation in specific regulatory contexts. What is already clear
is that when Congress and other policymakers contemplate creating new
agencies or reorganizing existing ones, they should compare different
ways of structuring agency authority to assess which ones best address the
concerns that prompted the desire to create or reorganize agency
programs. In doing so, they should take into account both the full range of
dimensions along which authority may be structured, as well as the
relative merits of dimensional allocations of authority that differ by
governmental function. Policymakers may be able to achieve more while
losing less, for example, by coordinating existing overlapping agency
authority rather than by centralizing it. Further, policymakers should
consider whether a shift in functional as opposed to substantive
jurisdiction would better promote values such as effectiveness, efficiency,
legitimacy, and fairness.
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